

Foreign Internal Defense



Air Force Doctrine Document 2-3.1 **10 May 2004**

This document complements related discussion found in Joint Publication 3-07.1,
Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense.

SUMMARY OF REVISIONS

This document is substantially revised. It updates key Air Force foreign internal defense (FID) doctrine concepts and terms throughout the publication. It includes a discussion of terrorism as an insurgency and as a threat facing the United States (US) and friendly nations and identifies FID activities as a key Air Force contribution to deterring the formation of terrorist organizations and combatting terrorism operations (page 8). It includes a revised discussion of social, economic, and political fragmentation and the local conditions that may serve as basis for the formation of insurgent movements (page 9). This leads to a revised center of gravity (COG) discussion (page 16). The role of air mobility rather than airlift is emphasized (page 17). Detailed discussion of the range of FID operations, as well as the command and control of FID forces, from indirect support through combat operations is included (page 31). The discussion of special operations forces' training that directly and indirectly contributes to training of host-nation forces is included (page 32). Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) is identified as the Air Force's major command with a specially trained combat aviation advisory unit (pages 32, 33). References applicable to US statutes that apply to FID are updated throughout (pages 33, 48, 58, 71). Strategic and operational planning considerations are included (page 35). FID is discussed as a multinational operation (page 34). The document also introduces new terminology concerning assessment of foreign military aviation capabilities, training of foreign military forces, advising foreign military and governmental agencies, and assisting foreign aviation forces (pages 67, 70, 75).

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FOREWORD

Foreign internal defense (FID) is an umbrella term for programs developed by the United States to support a host nation's (HN) program of internal defense and development (IDAD). In order to support FID operations, the United States employs a variety of diplomatic, economic, informational, and military instruments to help host governments protect their societies from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.

Air Force FID supports operations across the spectrum of warfare and primarily consists of assessing, training, advising, assisting, and integrating foreign aviation forces. Increased emphasis in this area can multiply our influence globally without requiring a standing-force presence in a multitude of locations. Air Force FID activities are a key contribution to combatting terrorism. FID activities provide the host nation assistance to prevent the establishment of terrorist organizations or to eradicate terrorist activities. The Global War on Terrorism will take place largely in the FID arena. Air Force FID activities aimed at helping foreign governments resist and defeat terrorism provide a major contribution to the overall Global War on Terrorism effort. Strengthening the ability of friends and allies to defend themselves or function as viable coalition partners will become vital instruments of US foreign policy.

There are situations when US forces fight as coalition partners with foreign forces. There will be other cases when our HN allies will have to take the tactical offensive with US advisory assistance. Air Force training and advisory assistance will, in many of those instances, become the instruments of both choice and necessity. Air and space power will undoubtedly play a crucial role in this conflict, and we know with certainty that the forces in many of those countries will not be able to engage in joint and coalition operations without Air Force FID assistance. FID activities will vary depending on the capability of allies as well as the regional threat.

Geographic combatant commanders are responsible for planning and executing military operations in support of FID in their regions. Air Force FID operations support US political and strategic military objectives primarily by enhancing the air and space capabilities of countries where US interests are important enough to warrant assistance. The strategic end game is a host nation capable of successfully integrating military force with other instruments of national power to eradicate lawlessness, terrorism, subversion, and insurgency.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION	v
FOUNDATIONAL DOCTRINE STATEMENTS.....	vii
CHAPTER ONE—Fundamentals.....	1
General.....	1
FID Operations	3
CHAPTER TWO—Operational Environment	7
General.....	7
Threat Forms.....	7
Host-nation Conditions.....	10
Social, Economic, and Political Conditions.....	10
Local Conditions.....	11
Air and Space Power in Developing Nations	11
Aircraft.....	12
Maintenance and Logistics	12
Personnel.....	12
Intelligence.....	13
Operations.....	13
CHAPTER THREE—The Role of Air and Space Power	15
General.....	15
Synergy with Internal Defense and Development (IDAD)	15
Air and Space Power Functions.....	17
Air Force Special Operations Forces	17
Air Mobility	17
Counterland.....	18
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance	19
Information Operations (IO).....	19
CHAPTER FOUR—FID Operations.....	23
General.....	23
Characteristics of Air Force FID Operations.....	23
Integrated Interagency Objectives	24
Spectrum of Operations	24
Indirect Support	25
Foreign Military Sales	26
International Military Education and Training (IMET).....	26
Direct Support (Not Involving Combat).....	27
Combat Operations	30
CHAPTER FIVE—Command and Control.....	31
General.....	31
Indirect Support	31
Direct Support.....	32
Combat Operations	33

Coordination	33
Joint Interagency Operations	34
Multinational Operations	34
CHAPTER SIX—Planning.....	35
General.....	35
Planning Requirements	36
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Support to FID	36
Logistics.....	37
Security Assistance Surge Operations	37
Psychological Operations (PSYOP)	39
Civil Affairs	40
Simulation and Gaming	40
CHAPTER SEVEN—Employment.....	41
General.....	41
Indirect Support	41
FID-provided Training.....	42
Security Assistance Teams	42
Air Force Special Operations Combat Aviation Advisory	45
Direct Support.....	46
Force Protection.....	46
CHAPTER EIGHT—Training.....	47
General.....	47
Types of Training.....	48
Training Sources	48
APPENDIX	
A. Insurgency and Counterinsurgency	49
B. Joint-Multinational Exercises	55
C. Air Force Security Assistance Teams	59
Suggested Readings	63
Glossary	65

INTRODUCTION

PURPOSE

Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-3.1, *Foreign Internal Defense*, provides Air Force doctrine for FID operations and supports basic air and space doctrine. AFDD 2-3.1 provides the Air Force perspective on FID operations and discusses the broad, enduring beliefs about the best way to employ air and space power in FID operations.

APPLICATION

This AFDD applies to all active duty, Air Force Reserve, Air National Guard, and civilian Air Force personnel.

The doctrine in this document is authoritative. Therefore, commanders need to consider the contents of this AFDD and the particular situation when accomplishing their missions. Airmen should read it, discuss it, and practice it.

SCOPE

This document articulates fundamental Air Force roles for FID and advises commanders how to employ and integrate Air Force resources to achieve US objectives through FID operations. It includes a discussion of the operational environment, command and control, planning considerations, and training.


FOUNDATIONAL DOCTRINE STATEMENTS

Foundational doctrine statements are the basic principles and beliefs upon which AFDDs are built. Other information in the AFDDs expands on or supports these statements.

- ✦ Foreign Internal Defense (FID) is participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.
- ✦ Ultimately, FID efforts are successful if they preclude the need to deploy large numbers of United States military personnel and equipment.
- ✦ Air Force FID can also establish a US Air Force presence, build rapport, exercise integration, and build a foundation for future operations.
- ✦ Air Force FID operations are aimed primarily at developing and sustaining host-nation airpower capabilities.
- ✦ The host nation's internal defense and development (IDAD) strategy provides the basis for determining appropriate air and space objectives.
- ✦ Situations most likely to involve Air Force FID activities are prevalent in developing nations where public services, industrial infrastructures, and air support facilities are relatively primitive
- ✦ Air Force FID operations do not automatically transition from indirect to direct forms of assistance based on certain conditions or specific series of events, but transition based on decisions originating with the President or Secretary of Defense.
- ✦ Command relationships and responsibilities for multinational exercises and operations are established in accordance with US and host-country agreements.

CHAPTER ONE

FUNDAMENTALS



Airdrop leaflet used by Commonwealth forces during Malayan Emergency

An insurgent movement is a war for the people. It stands to reason that government measures must be directed to restoring government authority and law and order throughout the country, so that control over the population can be regained and its support won.

—Sir Robert Thompson
Architect of the British counterinsurgency
victory in Malaya
(Malayan Emergency, 1948-1960)

GENERAL

Nations sometimes request assistance from other nations to help suppress unrest, rebellion, and terrorism so they may in turn create the conditions for economic growth, workable legal systems, and a more stable society in general. This external assistance may be political, economic, and military. For the United States, such military assistance takes the form of foreign internal defense (FID).

FID is participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. FID involves all elements of national power and can occur across the range of military operations. It includes training; materiel, technical, and organizational assistance; advice; infrastructure development; and tactical operations. Generally, the preferred methods of support are through assistance and development programs. Diplomatic, economic, informational, and military elements must be considered as they play a large role in FID.

Air Force FID should be designed to support and reinforce the host-nation's internal defense and development (IDAD) strategy—the host-nation's overarching strategy to focus all its instruments of national power on its internal problems of subversion, terrorism, lawlessness, and insurgency. The Air Force provides FID assistance to the supported country's air forces, but it may provide assistance to other host-military Services, depending on how air support responsibilities are assigned within the host country and on the types of air assets employed. Air Force FID incorporates a broad range of air and space missions, resources, and capabilities. These operations rely on special operations forces and conventional forces to achieve FID objectives. In most instances, Air Force FID operations are conducted jointly with other US Service components and combined with the activities of foreign military forces in the host

country. With proper authorization, Air Force operations may be conducted in support of other nation assistance programs or specific FID activities of other US Government departments and agencies.

The National Security Council is responsible for planning guidance for FID at the strategic level. The Department of State (DOS) is normally designated the lead agency for execution and the Department of Defense (DOD) provides personnel and equipment to help achieve stated FID objectives. The strategic end state is a host nation capable of successfully integrating military force with other instruments of national power to eradicate lawlessness, terrorism, subversion, and insurgency. **Ultimately, FID efforts are successful if they preclude the need to deploy large numbers of United States military personnel and equipment.**

Foreign Internal Defense – The Past to the Present

The United States has a long history of assisting the governments of friendly nations facing internal threats. The post-World War II policy of assisting friendly nations to develop stable governments to counter the threat of communism led to our involvement in the Greek civil war. The Greek Communist Party mounted a rural insurgency in 1946 against a war-weakened Greek government that threatened to absorb Greece into the communist Iron Curtain. The US provided economic, equipment, training, and advisory support pivotal to the Greek government's victory against the insurgency in 1949.

As in other cases from 1945 through 1989 (Malaya, the Philippines, Vietnam, and El Salvador), insurgency had its origins in communism. Communist-based insurgency following the end of the cold war and the demise of the Soviet Union no longer presents the same type of threat. The security challenges, as well as the relative stability, of a bipolar world have been replaced by increased uncertainty and often more dangerous problems. Insurgency based on political, socio-economic, or religious ideology is a serious threat. The fundamental concept of the IDAD program, supported by US training and materiel assistance in aiding friendly nations to develop stable governments and resist internal threats, is the foundation of FID and is an integral component in today's security environment.

—Various Sources

Air Force FID operations fall under the broader category of nation assistance. Nation assistance is comprised of three separate but complementary programs: humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA), security assistance (SA), and FID. SA—though having much wider application than FID—can be integrated with FID strategies and operations. It is employed as a principal means to help selected countries meet their internal defense needs and to promote sustainable development and growth of responsive institutions. **There is a clear distinction between personnel performing mission activities under the command, control, and supervision of a combatant commander and those performing them under the laws, regulations, and funding applicable to SA programs.**

The overall Air Force FID orientation is global, although some Air Force elements may be organized and trained for FID operations in specific geographic areas. FID operations may be conducted in the host country, in other friendly foreign countries, or in the United States. Air Force Foreign Area Officers proficient in foreign languages and area studies assist the Air Force to sustain coalitions, pursue regional stability, and contribute to multinational operations and FID efforts. International skills are a force multiplier and essential to the Air Force's ability to operate globally. Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) is the Air Force's major command (MAJCOM) specifically charged with maintaining forces trained and organized to conduct FID missions.

FID OPERATIONS

Air Force FID operations can help improve host air force contributions to peacetime stability and development, help prevent an outbreak of violence during the early stages of an internal confrontation in the host nation, and help prevent the establishment of terrorist organizations in the host nation. FID operations can also be used where an armed opponent internally threatens the host government. Most Air Force assistance during FID operations supports traditional air and space roles and missions of foreign military forces, but FID may also develop or augment host air and space capabilities for internal development and resource mobilization. Air Force advisory assistance may be used to improve the availability, safety, reliability, and interoperability of host-nation aviation resources supporting multinational and joint operations.

Air Force FID can also establish a US Air Force presence, build rapport, exercise integration, and build a foundation for future operations. Advisory operations build enduring relationships with foreign officials who may facilitate access to resources and real estate during contingencies. Time and time again, anti-access dilemmas have been overcome through bonds of trust forged between advisors and foreign military leaders.

Air Force FID operations are aimed primarily at developing and sustaining host-nation airpower capabilities. Air Force training and advisory assistance may be employed to facilitate the availability, reliability, safety, and interoperability of foreign aviation assets engaged in IDAD operations or in multinational actions. Air Force resources and abilities can be employed in more direct forms of support when host-country aviation units are inadequately sized or structured to make necessary and timely contributions to their defense effort. The United States views advisory operations as a cost-effective means of assisting friendly nations to deal with internal problems before they assume global dimensions requiring large-scale introduction of US combat forces. FID activities include the following (see figure 1.1):

- ❖ **Facilitate transfer of US defense articles and services** under the Security Assistance Program to eligible foreign government aviation units engaged in IDAD operations. Assistance to foreign aviation units can be provided through security assistance-funded mobile training teams (MTT) or delivery of foreign military sales items, or it can be performed in conjunction with other training programs conducted by the combatant commands and by various agencies of the US Government.

- ✧ **Assess foreign military aviation capabilities** and provide direction or recommendations towards improving their airpower employment and sustainment methods. Aviation assessments are carried out primarily in support of geographic combatant commander requirements and for other key agencies and departments of the US government. Assessments focus on foreign aviation capabilities and limitations, specifically aircrew capability and safety, aircraft airworthiness, critical resource availability, resource sustainability, and operational potential.
- ✧ **Train foreign military forces** to operate and maintain airpower capabilities and support facilities. Aviation training enables foreign aviation units to accomplish a variety of missions, technical functions, and skills. Training covers a variety of product sub-sets including operational tactics, techniques, and procedures in such areas as combat search and rescue; air-ground interface; aerial insertion, extraction, and resupply; surveillance/reconnaissance; close air support (CAS); and air drop operations. Training, as a key task, is neither time nor situation specific. Appropriately funded training, however, can be used to close specific gaps in foreign aviation skills and raise the level of competency where they can be advised on the proper employment of acquired capabilities. Training assistance in the aviation support and sustainment arena includes aircraft maintenance and supply; logistics; munitions; ground safety; life support; personal survival; air base defense; communications, command and control; and other functions supporting combat air operations.
- ✧ **Advise foreign military forces and governmental agencies** on how to employ airpower in specific operational situations. Advisory assistance is provided to both US combatant commands and foreign aviation units and is conducted within the context of specific times, places, and situations. It includes such product sub-sets as the use of airpower doctrine (i.e., how to employ airpower as opposed to how to operate airplanes); mission planning; basing concepts; operational sustainment methods; tactical employment; communication capability; and command and control development/employment for specific times, places, and situations. Along with training, Air Force advisory assistance helps foreign military forces and government agencies generate and sustain airpower supporting IDAD programs.
- ✧ **Assist foreign aviation forces in executing specific missions or contingency operations** through direct US Air Force participation in tactical operations and events. Assistance can take on many forms, but may include direct support to host countries with HCA, health service support (HSS), tactical intelligence, communications support, logistics, air mobility, on-board advisory assistance, and airpower for tactical operations. The goal is to help foreign military forces and government agencies generate and sustain airpower supporting IDAD programs.
- ✧ **Facilitate force integration for multinational operations.** Air Force personnel bring all other key tasks (assessing, training, advising, and assisting) together in a coordinated effort to draw foreign aviation forces into the theater campaign or contingency. The objective is to create a joint and multinational battlefield for theater operations and contingencies.

- ✦ **Provide direct support to host countries** with HCA, HSS, tactical intelligence, communications support, logistics, air mobility, and airpower for tactical operations.



Figure 1.1. FID Activities

CHAPTER TWO

OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

...it is clearer now than ever before that we must foster and maintain sufficient overseas presence and international relationships in order to conduct future training as well as contingency or combat operations. In essence, this is "geopresence"—a multifaceted presence that allows the US military to operate in any region of the world, promoted by conscious diplomatic, economic, military, and political involvement in the necessary regions and with the necessary countries.

—General Gregory S. Martin,
Quoted in *Air and Space Power Journal*,
Summer 2003



Military operations from Aviano Air Base in Italy provide overseas presence.

GENERAL

This chapter addresses the threats of lawlessness, terrorism, subversion, and insurgency to a legitimate government and the global implication of terrorism. The conditions conducive to the formation of insurgent groups are discussed. These same conditions present challenges to the government and impact host-air and space capabilities frequently encountered during FID operations. Commanders should assess each situation on its own, taking into account the total operational environment before employing a specific strategy. The desired objective is to achieve an understanding of the host nation's situation and apply Air Force FID efforts effectively.

THREAT FORMS

Lawlessness, terrorism, subversion, and insurgency manifest themselves in many forms capable of seriously challenging the authority and survival of host-nation governments. Discussed below are examples of internal threats that may require some form of host-nation assistance and Air Force FID assistance. Strategic and operational level planning considerations should be addressed in advance to effectively plan for these internal threats.

Lawlessness may occur when a government does not have effective control over its population or territories. Lawlessness may also exist when there is no oversight or ability to control the formation or activities of lawless organizations. Nations are often unable to extend governmental control to outlying regions. They may not have the technological ability to form a

physical presence to do so. Local dissident groups may use terrorism against citizens or property to illustrate their cause or to prove the ineptitude of the government.

Illegal drug production and narcoterrorism are forms of lawlessness. International drug cartels seek a permissive environment or desire to suppress government interference in drug production and trafficking operations. “Partnerships” involving exchanges of drugs, weapons, and money between insurgents and drug cartels may also be used to support subversive activities, terrorist organizations, and revolutionary movements. The terrorist organization, insurgents, and drug cartels may share a common infrastructure. In such cases, revolutionary or separatist claims may be fraudulently used for the purpose of justifying the cartel’s existence. Lawlessness is destabilizing to a legitimate regime and may also serve to promote insurgent goals.

Terrorism carried out in pursuit of goals that are religious, as well as political and ideological, may be aimed at replacing secular-leaning regimes that give in to, or encourage, forces of change and modernization that threaten to sweep away old fundamentalist orders and ways of life. **At the opening of the 21st century the most dangerous form of violence threatening the internal security of free nations is terrorism of regional origin expanded into insurgency of global scope and implication. Global terrorism extends the threat of internal violence to virtually every country in the world, threatening internal security through lawlessness and subversion linked to insurgent goals.**

US security interests can be adversely affected both in the United States and abroad when HN governments fall internally to terrorist violence. In some cases, internal security efforts of foreign friends and allies may require United States assistance through FID. In addition to helping other countries manage internal conflicts on their own through training and advisory assistance, the Air Force can help with intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) coverage and with certain forms of direct assistance shortening the “find-fix-track-target-engage-assess” cycle. FID initiatives can provide a viable means of dealing with this global terrorist phenomenon in the developing world.

The classic imperatives of insurgency are at full play in this arena. Political mobilization and legitimacy are totally engaged, promoted on a global scale by terrorist operatives. The scene shifts from governments fighting field-worn guerrillas and political cadres roaming the country side winning hearts and minds to international networks of financiers, investors, promoters, recruiters, weapons trainers, forgery experts, communications specialists, electronics technicians, spies, bombers, and shooters deeply imbedded in every country of the industrial and non-industrial worlds. Insurgency prosecuted as terrorism has global impact and now includes global reach capabilities.

In the 21st century, there may be an increase of terrorist operations within countries whose governments are vulnerable to insurgency and who do not have effective control over their population or territory. After the 11 September 2001 attack, the fight against Al Qaeda was extended beyond Afghanistan to the remote islands of the Philippines. The threat has now extended from nations hostile to the United States to nations who are unable to effectively prevent or eliminate the terrorist threat. The emergent challenge to the United States Air Force

in the Global War on Terrorism resides in the increased likelihood of having to provide FID support and intervention in countries of the developing world where societies are at increased risk of insurgency and its various manifestations.

Selection of Air Force capabilities to assist friendly nations to counter internal threats and prosecute the Global War on Terrorism will depend upon the strength and capability of the host nations being assisted. The social, economic, and political circumstances of the host nation, the local conditions, and the efficacy of the host nation's air and space power capabilities are determinants, in conjunction with the host nation's IDAD strategy, in planning an operation for Air Force FID operations.

Subversion is an action designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, or political strength or morale of a regime. Examples include anarchy arising from political and economic crises, ethnic and religious confrontations, and armed disputes among rival political factions external to the government. Certain forms of civil disorder can also produce widespread violence and social upheaval that may precipitate a host government's collapse. These situations may require military reinforcement of host civil law enforcement agencies. Local dissident groups may use terrorism against citizens and property, which are symbols of government authority, to dramatize political causes or to extort concessions from host governments. Terrorism used as a tactical instrument in guerrilla warfare serves to demonstrate the inability of incumbent regimes to defend themselves and their population.

The threat of **insurgency** to legitimate governments, as well as the potential for the insurgency to become regional or even global in scope, presents a serious challenge to the stability of free nations. While insurgencies each have their individual characteristics, common dimensions exist in the formation of an insurgency. Social, economic, and political fragmentation provide the conditions for an insurgent movement, and these conditions, coupled with the insurgents' ideology, provide the persuasive binding impetus to gain the support of the population, ultimately and seriously challenging the authority and survival of host-nation governments. Insurgency may begin with acts of lawlessness, followed by organized subversion. Terrorism is a tool as well as a serious threat that may be employed throughout all stages.

Insurgency is a complex, protracted form of subversion employing psychological pressure, armed force, and terror to force or prevent social, economic, and political changes within the host nation. Insurgencies often develop as a result of domestic perceptions that a host government is unable or unwilling to solve important domestic economic or political problems. An insurgent's aim is legitimacy derived from a population. Popular support fuels the political mobilization required to generate workers, fighters, money, and weapons while denying the same to the government. Addressing critical economic and political issues by host governments is central to countering insurgencies and should generally take precedence over military force. Insurgent strategy tends to be persuasive. Its basis may not only be on the conditions that affect a population, it often has an ideological dimension. The ideology may be based on social, economic, political, or religious venues.

The relationship of force to these central issues warrants special consideration in planning and executing military actions. Appendix A discusses that relationship and provides a

basis for countering the insurgents' organization and strategy.

HOST-NATION CONDITIONS

Social, economic, and political fragmentation conditions often allow the development of subversive elements or provide the foundation for an insurgent movement. The insurgents' ideology, often tied to fragmentation conditions, provides the persuasive binding impetus to gain the support of the population, a necessity for the formation and success of an insurgent movement. Fragmentation is often exacerbated by local environmental conditions. As insurgency is frequently a struggle between a non-ruling group and a legitimate government where each seeks to create resources, gain popular support, and/or sustain the basis for legitimacy, the extant conditions impact both the insurgents as well as the host nation.

Social, Economic, and Political Conditions

Nations most susceptible to subversion, terrorism, lawlessness, and insurgency are characterized by various forms of social, economic, and political fragmentation. Some examples include ethnic separatism or discrimination, lack of accessibility to government resources by certain groups, alienation, poor income distribution among social classes, or disenfranchisement or lack of other political rights.

Social fragmentation and identity problems often result from rigid class distinctions and from ethnic, linguistic, religious, and economic differences between ruling elites and much larger population segments. These differences, often exacerbated and sustained by geography, persist where nations have failed to overcome the isolation of outlying provinces and villages. Similar conditions of sociopolitical separation and disenfranchisement exist in cities and provincial capitals where local governments and economies are unable to support or assimilate masses of landless rural people moving into the fringes of urban society.

Severe alienation results when political and legal mechanisms are unable or unwilling to protect the rights and privileges of citizens. Military as well as civilian law enforcement agencies are often viewed as symbols of repression. Sociopolitical instability is closely tied to a variety of economic factors. Extreme, widespread poverty is often coupled with dramatic imbalances in the distribution of wealth and property. In some cases, industrial monopolies, marketing controls, restrictions on organized labor, and other forms of economic exploitation maintain the imbalance. Unstable monetary systems and the lack of public service programs often create negative social attitudes towards the government.

Unfulfilled economic expectations sustained by widespread unemployment and chronic inflation add to deep-seated unrest. These factors, on their own, do not necessarily generate violence, but revolutionary groups and dissidents exploit them to shape popular attitudes against the government.

A poorly developed physical infrastructure is often common among nations susceptible to insurgency. Further, the economies of developing nations typically rely on a narrow range of industry and farm production that hostile elements can easily exploit or attack. Financial insolvency is a critical factor that often limits the ability of host governments to preempt or counter internal threats. These nations are also susceptible to the development of terrorist

organizations within their borders. **Situations most likely to involve Air Force FID activities are prevalent in developing nations where public services, industrial infrastructures, and air support facilities are relatively primitive.**

Local Conditions

Difficult terrain, seasonal weather patterns, physical isolation of population groups, and poorly developed physical infrastructures often impede military operations, but such obstacles also provide opportunities to use air and space power in a variety of combat and noncombat roles.

Terrain varies widely and can impact FID operations. Typically, rugged or austere terrain, adverse climate, and the scarcity of improved airfields affect not only the tempo, scale, and character of air operations but also the types of aircraft that can be employed.

In some regions, seasonal weather patterns dictate the timing and form of military campaigning. Major offensives supported exclusively by ground logistics may be restricted to prolonged periods of dry weather. During extended periods of heavy rain and high water, air and space power offers significant advantages in rural administration, logistics, and tactical mobility.

Surface transportation networks vary greatly. Hard-surface roads and rail lines may not extend into the interior. Ground lines of communication (LOCs) are often subject to seasonal flooding as well as interdiction by insurgent forces. In many cases, air transportation affords the only reliable form of physical contact with civil-military elements in rural areas.

Information distribution networks vary greatly. Television and radio broadcasting has dramatically improved host-government development and mobilization efforts in some developing nations. Most nations possess rudimentary telephone networks connecting major population centers but these networks often do not extend into rural areas. Ground communication links are often targeted for interdiction. The growing use of cellular phones and internet services now offer insurgents effective communications capabilities.

AIR AND SPACE POWER IN DEVELOPING NATIONS

In the majority of cases, host nations only possess relatively limited airpower capabilities. Few developing nations possess viable space power capabilities. Further, limited but capable domestic information capabilities may or may not exist. In general, **Air Force FID operations focus on support to host-nation aviation capabilities.** By Air Force standards, the scale of military air and space operations in these nations may be relatively small in terms of force size, total sortie potential, resource consumption and availability, and overall support costs. For example, the entire fixed-wing tactical air mobility capability of these nations may consist of only a limited number of small or medium transports. The contributions of these aircraft, however, can be vital to the success of counterinsurgency or drug suppression operations. Because host governments possess so few aircraft, airframe availability, maintenance turnaround times, and sortie generation rates are critical.

Though inventories are small, sustainment and supportability are difficult problems. Because of funding constraints and supply shortages in host countries, small logistics problems can have a major impact on air operations. Grounding or combat loss of one or two aircraft can

seriously impair or neutralize an air effort.

Aircraft

Host-military aircraft available for IDAD operations (air mobility, reconnaissance, surveillance, forward air control, and close air support [CAS]) are typically well-used, older generation aircraft acquired from the United States and other foreign sources. These aircraft are often difficult to maintain because of dwindling sources of spare parts and supplies and the lack of commonality with existing US Air Force parts inventories. However, the complexity and cost of modern systems magnify new aircraft procurement and life cycle support problems. Consequently, the older aircraft may be the only viable option. Host nations threatened by insurgency and other forms of internal conflict usually require some form of outside financial or materiel assistance to acquire, operate, and maintain their air forces. In some cases, their military aviation programs are entirely dependent upon foreign assistance for major weapon systems, aviation support equipment, aircraft spares, training, advice, technical services, survival equipment, specialized clothing, munitions, and even consumables.

Maintenance and Logistics

Most military aviation support facilities are able to conduct routine maintenance on piston-driven aircraft. A few have a limited capability for airframe overhaul and rebuild of non-pressurized aircraft and jet engine repair facilities are extremely limited. In most developing nations, there are no facilities for major overhaul of aircraft engines. Subsequently, in regions where major aircraft repair facilities do exist, they are often located only in the civilian sector. Local shop facilities may have limited capabilities for test and calibration. Depot-level repair and overhaul facilities for support items are not generally available. In many cases, aircraft support items and services are not available from local sources. Often insufficient technical skills, scarcity of tools and equipment, and lack of adequate plant facilities in the host nation limit aircraft and support system maintenance capabilities.

Personnel

Generally, military aviation programs in developing nations rely on an extremely narrow base of trained personnel to accomplish even routine operational tasks and support functions. Routine flight line servicing and maintenance often suffer because technical manuals are not always published in the local language. Maintenance technicians may lack the foreign language skills needed to receive technical instruction and advice from outside sources. Although basic flying skills are often highly developed, many individuals are insufficiently trained in joint tactics, techniques, and procedures. The most serious training deficiencies are generally in aircraft and support systems maintenance. Most host-aviation units lack technical proficiency and mid-level supervision in these functional areas.

Technical training for qualified students is often severely limited because formal courses of instruction and on-the-job training programs have not been sufficiently developed or resources are not available to fund instruction. In some cases, a large portion of the enlisted force, often composed primarily of conscripts and short-term enlistees, do not receive technical training during their period of service because they lack the required education (principally math and reading skills), mechanical background, and service retention. Internal instruction programs are

difficult to establish due to insufficient numbers of qualified technicians to instruct others and maintain the assigned force. In most cases, outside training assistance is needed to generate host-nation training programs capable of self-sustaining operations.

Intelligence

Intelligence collection capabilities are limited in scope. Human resources intelligence (HUMINT), often a valuable source of information, is limited by the lack of all-source analysis and fusion. Nevertheless, HUMINT is often the best source for intelligence many host nations possess. Often, host-nation reconnaissance and surveillance aircraft lack the means of collecting intelligence through thermal imaging and most are incapable of exploiting the electromagnetic medium beyond a very limited capacity for communications intercept. Generally, collection is limited to visual and photographic means. That said, usually only a limited number of air platforms are configured for photoreconnaissance. Even where intelligence resources and programs and a viable cadre of intelligence professionals exist, the lack of efficient procedures for timely dissemination of tactical intelligence often degrades overall mission effectiveness.

Operations

Communications capabilities may be antiquated. To offset the lack of modern communications, developing nations often exercise considerable resourcefulness in designing communications for military air operations. This resourcefulness, however, often entails the use of obsolete, low-performance radios that provide poor connectivity between air and surface elements. The makeshift nature of communications often found within the typical host country renders it extremely vulnerable to enemy intercept and jamming. Air request networks may not extend into remote areas of the interior. A general lack of communications security training and procedures further degrade command and control effectiveness.

Aerial port facilities vary. Most capital cities in developing nations are served by airports capable of accepting medium to heavy multiengine jet aircraft. However, conducting military air operations from major civilian airports is often impractical, due to traffic congestion, space restrictions, and political sensitivity. Outside capital cities, civil and military aviation support facilities are relatively primitive. In many cases, military aviation units have access to only one or two main operating locations with hard-surface runways. Forward operating locations usually consist of short, unimproved airstrips with limited approach or runway lighting, central electric power, and no passive defense capabilities. Modern, ground-based navigational aids may be extremely limited. Nondirectional beacons are prevalent, though often unreliable. Except for navigation aids found at air installations occupied by US military forces, there are generally no terminal approach aids outside international airports. As a consequence, military flying operations rely extensively on visual flight rules procedures or global positioning system (GPS) navigation.

Insurgency in El Salvador
The US Air Force's Role in Training the Salvadoran Air Force

El Salvador was the scene of escalating violence from a mix of factions through the 1970s. These groups eventually culminated in 1980 into a common organization, the Farabundo Marti Liberation Front (FMLN) and carried the marks of communist influence. The FMLN depended heavily on the Soviet Union, Cuba, and Nicaragua for support.

The United States response to the communist insurgency in El Salvador was vastly different from the US military build-up and involvement in South Vietnam. The United States specifically limited involvement to a small number of troops stationed in the country and limited their involvement to training.

The Salvadoran Air Force consisted largely of US supplied aircraft. The USAF trained the Salvadoran pilots and maintenance personnel and provided limited advice on flying operations and tactics. Restrictions prohibited USAF personnel from flying with Salvadorans on combat or combat support missions and from performing operations on Salvadoran equipment or aircraft. By 1987 the Salvadoran Air Force owned 135 aircraft, but still only half as many pilots. The Salvadoran Air Force also did not have training facilities or instructor pilots. Pilots and maintenance personnel had to maintain proficiency in more than one aircraft type hindering their ability to attain mission readiness. The United States responded by improving their training program, sending the Salvadorans to the Inter-American Air Force Academy.

The FMLN launched a final and unsuccessful offensive against El Salvador in 1989. Peace accords were finally signed between the FMLN and the El Salvador in 1992. While the United States strengthened the ability of El Salvador to defend themselves, the peace in El Salvador was fought for and won by Salvadorans

**—Annual History of USAF Southern Air Division
Howard AFB, Panama 1983, 1984, and 1985**

CHAPTER THREE

THE ROLE OF AIR AND SPACE POWER

Small war situations are usually a phase of, or an operation taking place concurrently with, diplomatic effort.

—US Marine Corp
Small Wars Manual,
1940 edition



Operations in Haiti tested military responsiveness and diplomatic resolve.

GENERAL

Air and space power should always be properly applied during internal conflicts involving subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. Although specific methods and applications may vary according to the nature and location of the conflict, operations in this environment are founded on the basic tenets of air and space power and apply equally to United States and host-nation forces. **The tenets of centralized control and decentralized execution, flexibility and versatility, synergistic effects, persistence, concentration, balance, and priority should guide the application of FID assistance to the host nation's IDAD strategy.**

SYNERGY WITH INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT (IDAD)

Air Force FID assistance should be designed to support and reinforce the host-nation's IDAD strategy (i.e., the host-nation's overarching strategy to focus all its instruments of national power on the internal problems of subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency). Typical IDAD strategy, illustrated in figure 3.1, incorporates four basic tasks designed to help prevent or counter internal threats.

IDAD TASKS

- ✦ Develop Balanced Social, Economic, and Political Institutions
- ✦ Mobilize Manpower and Materiel
- ✦ Secure the Population and Natural Resources
- ✦ Neutralize Hostile Elements

Figure 3.1. IDAD Strategy to Task

The host nation's IDAD strategy provides the basis for determining appropriate air and space objectives.

Air and space operations are most successful when their resources and methods support the total range of IDAD strategies. Versatility is central to

the value of air and space power, and it should be aggressively exploited in countering subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.

The principal weight of the air and space power effort should support the overall internal defense effort. Where airpower is applied, it should create effects on one or more of the insurgent movement's centers of gravity (COGs). Determining an insurgent's COGs may be challenging, as many of the things generally thought of as COGs may not exist. Leadership may not be easily identifiable or accessible and will probably have a limited fixed-support structure. Their irregular forces are often deployed in small units that find easy concealment in rural or urban terrain and sometimes within civilian society itself. The legitimate government and insurgents often share a common COG—the civilian population. To be successful, the insurgency normally relies on the population for some or all of its support. An insurgent strategy tends to be persuasive. The legitimate government may face not only a military struggle, but also a political and socioeconomic struggle as well. Consequently, airpower should enhance the capability of the government and help gain civilian population support. A COG analysis should reveal sources of social, economic, or political fragmentation exploited by the insurgents; leadership functions; sources of the “will to fight,” and the strategies that obtain popular, economic, and/or logistical support that sustains the insurgent or terrorist force and enables it to act. Air Force FID advisors, planners, and analysts should be aware of how smaller, more indigenous, and often less intense operations differ from more conventional military operations. Any negative impact on the civilian population may provide further legitimacy to the insurgent movement. Air Force FID operations should be planned to support the IDAD priorities of a nation.

Airpower can contribute most effectively to security and neutralization when it functions as an integrated, joint component of the overall internal defense effort. It is least effective when employed unilaterally as a substitute for ground maneuver or long-range artillery. In many instances, airpower can be exploited to greatest advantage by emphasizing surveillance and logistics mobility over firepower. Where insurgents are unwilling to concentrate their forces and are integrated within the civilian population, they present poor targets for air attack. The application of firepower, an errant bomb, loss of civilian life, or damage to civilian property can be used against the government and provide increased support for the insurgents. Air support for security and neutralization should be used primarily to inform, deploy, sustain, and reinforce surface elements of the internal security force. The emphasis on surveillance and mobility also applies to military operations performing counterdrug activities and to government actions suppressing terrorism and aggravated forms of civil disorder. For instance, where friendly lives and property are at risk from insurgent attack, airpower can serve as a component of a coordinated joint security and neutralization effort aimed at creating a safe environment for development programs which, in turn, promote and sustain mobilization. Airpower can demonstrate to the population that the legitimate government is in control

Where IDAD actions are focused on socioeconomic development and mobilization, air and space resources are employed “administratively” in support of infrastructure development and mobilization. These roles are principally logistics and communications efforts to establish government influence and control in contested areas of the country. Using airpower in these roles enhances the host-government's ability to focus on political and economic solutions to the

crisis. To achieve its strategic aims, a host government should establish and maintain effective administration and control on the ground, often in contested areas. Host-government presence and persistence—crucial aspects of administering in contested areas—can be supported by air and space power. At the same time, air and space power’s flexibility can help government forces achieve rapid concentration of effort from great distances and overcome terrain features. As the government brings all four typical IDAD tasks into play, air and space power is used to create synergies among various defense and development initiatives. Appendix A provides additional details.

AIR AND SPACE POWER FUNCTIONS

Depending on the objectives and the general situation, air, space, and information assets can support FID operations. In all cases where air and space power may be applied (combat or noncombat roles), commanders should consider the political, military, and psychological implications of using air and space power.

Air Force Special Operations Forces

Special operations forces/components complement all other joint and multinational operations. These forces offer extended military capabilities and tailored options providing great flexibility, stealth, surgical execution, speed, and surprise. As with all special operations, the air portion of the special operation is inherently offensive in nature and is especially useful in situations where insurgency and terrorist threats are not amenable to large-scale conventional solutions. Special operations forces conducting a special air operation should be primarily organized, trained, and equipped to support special operations surface forces in hostile or denied territory with air mobility and resupply, insertion and extraction, personnel recovery, ISR, and CAS. Special air operations should enable special operations surface forces to conduct small-unit, tactical operations in territory that cannot be accessed or occupied by conventional forces. The development and maintenance of special air operations will be particularly important to countries that must deal with such internal, asymmetric threats as guerrilla insurgency, criminal subversion, terrorism, and illicit drug production and trafficking. Special air operations require extensive, specialized training in such skills as helicopter alternate insertion and extraction, remote operations, aerial gunnery, night vision devices, and fixed-wing aerial delivery, air-land insertion and extraction, personnel air-drop techniques, air-ground interface, psychological operations (PSYOP), and CAS to accomplish their mission.

Air Mobility

Air refueling, airlift, and air mobility support increase the host-government’s capacity to administer and mobilize in outlying areas by physically extending the reach of public policy and information programs. Air mobility also provides a means of rapidly transporting security forces and supplies to forward areas. Commanders should consider the use of a tanker airlift control element (TALCE) to facilitate air mobility operations when appropriate.

To promote balanced development and mobilization through nation assistance, air transportation can be used to access remote regions and bring in resources and personnel to address a wide variety of problems and issues. Airlift, by fixed- or rotor-winged aircraft, for

example, can bring in specialists and trainers to remote regions who can provide on-site technical training and assistance in specific areas like public services management, sanitation and hygiene, agronomy, agribusiness management and technology (marketing, supply, and distribution), veterinary medicine, ecology, environmental protection, and public schools administration. Air mobility can also support developmental initiatives by delivering construction equipment, supplies, and personnel for building rural housing projects, power generation plants and hydroelectric facilities, bridge building, and other public works programs. In some instances, air mobility can support political goals by extending the electoral process to rural groups.

To support security and neutralization, air mobility can be used to deploy, sustain, and reinforce civil law enforcement agencies as well as military and paramilitary surface elements. Logistics functions are carried out through air landing, airdrop, and aerial extraction of equipment, supplies, and personnel. Air mobility operations can include any combination of combat assault operations, medical evacuation, emergency extraction of military forces, noncombatant evacuation, troop movement, and resupply. Air mobility can also be used for infiltration and recovery of ground reconnaissance teams, surveillance personnel, and special intelligence resources.

Counterland

Airpower can often support security and neutralization efforts very effectively through counterland operations. When hostile elements openly commit their forces against friendly positions or when their logistics elements are exposed and clearly identified, airpower may be the most appropriate means of achieving desired effects against them.

Counterinsurgency operations may rely significantly on air-delivered munitions for CAS in site defense, convoy escort, offensive tactical maneuvers, and other troops-in-contact situations. CAS, if required, should be limited to protecting the surface force by using tactics and munitions designed for suppression, shock, and intimidation, rather than maximum lethality. Exceeding this purpose through excessive, indiscriminate applications of firepower can result in death or injury of innocent civilians and unwarranted property damage. In countering other forms of lawlessness (illicit drug production and civil disorders, for instance), surface operations are often aimed at controlling territory, arresting people, and seizing contraband, rather than inflicting casualties.

Interdiction involves actions taken to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy's surface military forces and capabilities before they can be used effectively against friendly forces. Commanders should consider the risks and benefits of interdiction during FID operations. Interdiction relies heavily on accurate intelligence and is most effective when coordinated with ground-based search and verification. Interdicting "suspected" enemy positions without positive identification risks alienating friendly citizens and can quickly deplete the host air force's munitions inventory. Collateral damage involving loss of civilian life and property should be avoided wherever possible through careful target identification and planning, proper weapons selection, and accurate ordnance delivery. As is true of all military operations, short-term tactical tasks and objectives should support operational and strategic goals.

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

Air and space power can help provide situational awareness to FID operations through robust ISR capabilities. Air and space ISR platforms can support various forms of intelligence collection for all aspects of security and neutralization. This support may be provided to civilian law enforcement agencies engaged in insurgent, terrorist, or drug cartel undercover operations, or to host-nation military and paramilitary units engaged in combatting hostile forces. In some cases, platforms equipped with signals intelligence (SIGINT) or imagery intelligence capabilities may be used to identify and assess insurgent, terrorist, or drug enterprise infrastructures. Aerial- or space-based reconnaissance and surveillance can be used to monitor the condition of isolated friendly enclaves, surface LOCs, and civilian population groups, or to collect intelligence on enemy strength, location, and movement in denied areas. Information on hostile activities is also accessible through many ISR disciplines, including HUMINT. Air and space assets can expand and accelerate the HUMINT process by opening up collection sites not accessible by surface transportation and by speeding up collection and recovery of time-sensitive data.

Information Operations (IO)

Information operations also contribute to the air force effort to support FID operations. Specific information operations such as PSYOP and public affairs operations, for example, can help defeat insurgencies and help support host governments. Other information operations may also support FID operations.



The EC-130 COMMANDO SOLO is capable of disseminating PSYOP messages as well as performing other IO missions.

PSYOP should be integrated when appropriate into all aspects of FID operations. This incorporation can boost development, mobilization, security, and neutralization strategies in order to disrupt the unity and motivation of hostile forces and to politically isolate them from friendly civilian elements. PSYOP can be used to help turn hostile elements into neutral elements and neutral elements friendly. While not part of PSYOP, public affairs operations can help support the overall PSYOP effort. See AFDD 2-5.4, *Public Affairs Operations*.

To support PSYOP initiatives, air and space resources can deliver information by radio, television, loudspeakers, and print. Using air mobility to establish the physical presence of government officials at isolated locations increases and improves information dissemination and collection efforts with the added benefit of building psychological support among target audiences.

Internal Conflict: The Philippine Experience 1946-1954

The Philippines was the scene of a rural-based communist insurgency during the years 1946-1954. The Philippines was granted independence from American colonialization in 1946 and was threatened by the Communist Party of the Philippines which mobilized guerilla forces originally formed during World War II to struggle against the Japanese. The insurgent group was known as the Hukbalahap. The Philippine government was newly established, struggling with the after-effects of the war, and ill-equipped to deal with the threat as the military was in the process of being rebuilt.

A significant portion of the land area of the Philippines is not suitable for agriculture and yet over 80 percent of the Filipinos lived on the land. The land tenure system consisted of large estates share-cropped by tenants. Wealth was concentrated in the hands of the few with most of the rural population living at a low standard. The strongest appeal of the insurgents was to the land hunger of the people which the Hukbalahaps sloganized as “land for the landless”.

The Philippine government recognized the need to influence by means other than force the actions and attitudes of all those who played a role in the insurgency and in the effort to counter it. A civic action office was established at the Secretary of Defense level with units at each echelon down to battalion acting as advisors to commanders. Their purpose was to publish a newspaper for the Philippine troops, print leaflets, print surrender passes and develop psychological programs aimed at the insurgents, as well as producing films and traveling cabarets for the civilian rural population in “Huklandia”, as the areas under insurgent control became to be called.

Government programs involving building roads, repairing bridges, digging wells, rebuilding houses and building schools developed good relations with the population and undercut the appeal of the insurgents. Loyalty to the government was necessary.

An unusual combination of governmental programs and information operations was aimed directly against the demand of “land for the landless.” The Philippine government offered to resettle and provide land to any surrendered Hukbalahap. The details of the program were broadcast by radio and leaflets.

The coordinated efforts of the internal development programs and information operations successfully countered the communist insurgency in the Philippines.

—Various Sources

In addition to technical means of information delivery, air and space forces possess inherent capabilities to produce psychological effects by demonstrating superior mobility, responsiveness, and firepower. The psychological effect of air activities on the behavior of target groups may be pursued as a principal goal to weaken enemy resistance, capture public support, or both. As psychological effects may be intentional or unintentional, they may produce a secondary benefit resulting from such initiatives as humanitarian assistance (HA) and civic assistance action.

Whether intended or not, the inherent psychological effects of air and space power can exert forceful and often dramatic influences on the attitudes of both friendly and hostile elements. These effects should be anticipated in planning and executing all air, space, and information activities. Finally, the use of air and space resources in security and neutralization should be accompanied by robust public affairs operations when and where appropriate. Public affairs programs can be designed to relieve anxiety and fear among friendly civilian elements regarding government security forces' intentions and targets. **Public affairs operations can help counter insurgent disinformation and propaganda and ensure that friendly elements understand, accept, and support government policies and programs.** Development and mobilization programs involving military security forces should include informational initiatives that clarify and promote government intentions. Air transportation of public information officials can provide a means of disseminating vital information when development and mobilization actions are undertaken in isolated areas. Public affairs operations can be an effective tool to bolster a host nation's public support for counterinsurgency operations.

CHAPTER FOUR

FID OPERATIONS

Even with the myriad combat-oriented operations that occurred over the past decade, US air and space power extends our nation's reach in more subtle ways. From Mozambique to the Philippines to Europe to South America, air and space power supports diplomatic and humanitarian efforts to ease suffering and improve human dignity for thousands each year. This stance sends a dramatic, asymmetric double message to both people and governments: (1) "Air and space power can deliver justice to your borders as easily as it delivers food, medicine, and other supplies," and (2) "America prefers to help rather than to destroy."

—Lt Col Anthony C. Cain, Editor,
Air and Space Power Journal (Spring 2003)



Humanitarian operations in Mozambique helped ease suffering for thousands.

GENERAL

This chapter addresses basic FID operations. Operations are divided into three major categories—indirect support, direct support (not involving combat), and combat operations. Although various capabilities, programs, and activities within these categories may occur simultaneously, the categories themselves represent significantly different levels of Air Force involvement. They also indicate the broad range of Air Force FID options that can be exercised depending upon the level of US military commitment.

CHARACTERISTICS OF AIR FORCE FID OPERATIONS

All forms of Air Force FID support are considered strategically defensive, though in some cases, they may be tactically or operationally offensive. US Air Force FID operations support US response measures taken according to the principles of international and domestic law that affirm the inherent right of states to assist one another in maintaining internal order against insurgency and other forms of internal violence.

This is based upon the host government's inherent right of self-defense, recognized in Article 51 of the United Nations (UN) charter and in international law in general. The UN charter also recognizes, through the right of collective self-defense, that targets of aggression may request assistance, to include armed assistance, from other states. Such requests, under international law, should be evaluated according to the principles of necessity and

proportionality. Normally, the Air Force will conduct FID operations when the President or Secretary of State honors a host-government request for military assistance and Air Force forces have been directed to do so by the appropriate legal authorities.

INTEGRATED INTERAGENCY OBJECTIVES

The first requirement for Air Force FID operations is to ensure that commanders clearly articulate military objectives based on the HN and US objectives. Air Force FID activities should be sensitive to HN needs while directly relating plans and operations of other participating departments, executive agencies, and US Government organizations. There are many competing and complementing factors that comprise the totality of overall US FID effort. Commanders should structure the FID effort to fit the precise requirements of the conflict at hand. It is important that various FID efforts function together coherently with the FID framework as shown in Figure 1.1. Commanders should ensure that Air Force FID related security assistance efforts and direct support operations function as integrated elements of the overall US FID effort. Additionally, the Air Force commanders and their assigned or attached forces should be prepared to function as part of a joint-interagency team with mutually supporting programs and objectives. Clearly defined relationships among various forms of direct and indirect assistance are critical to the overall FID effort.

Air and space power functions as a force multiplier in countering lawlessness, terrorism, subversion, and insurgency by increasing the survivability and effectiveness of internal security activities. As a force multiplier, air and space power is most useful during the early stages of conflict when the host-government's chances of success are highest. Early Air Force initiatives to develop or improve host capabilities also reduce the need for higher forms of direct support or intervention.

SPECTRUM OF OPERATIONS

The Air Force capabilities described in the following paragraphs help commanders develop appropriate FID options to support US objectives and are specifically tailored to the air and space needs and capabilities of host nations. These capabilities fall under three main FID categories—indirect support, direct support (not involving combat), and combat operations—as illustrated in figure 4.1.

All decisions to engage in combat are policy decisions made by the appropriate, legally empowered, authorities. **Air Force FID operations do not automatically transition from indirect to direct forms of assistance based on certain conditions or specific series of events, but transition based on decisions originating with the President or Secretary of Defense.** If direct support is required, the level and type of assistance should be appropriate to the situation and should preserve or increase host-nation strength and responsibility for self-defense. Direct support should be withdrawn as soon as possible consistent with host-nation needs and capabilities. Joint Publication (JP) 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*; JP 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*; and JP 3-07.1, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense*, contain the joint framework for FID. Within this

framework, the principal thrust of Air Force FID operations should be to encourage and support host-nation solutions to their problems of subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency, thus reducing the possibility of direct US military involvement. Accordingly, Air Force support is usually applied indirectly through security assistance training, advisory help, and logistics support. Additionally, the Air Force can provide certain forms of direct support that do not commit US forces to combat. If all other options have been exhausted and the United States decides to use force, the Air Force has the capability to engage in combat to meet US and host-nation objectives. Tailored Air Force teams can assess, train, advise, assist, and integrate (into multinational/joint operations) host-nation aviation forces in employment and sustainment at all three levels of US support.




Figure 4.1. The Spectrum of Air Force FID

Indirect Support

Indirect support emphasizes Air Force efforts to develop and sustain host-nation self-sufficiency. Security assistance, appropriately supplemented by joint/multinational exercises and other joint initiatives, constitutes the primary Air Force contribution to indirect support FID operations.

Security assistance is a principal military instrument for FID when it involves the transfer of defense articles and services to friendly foreign governments through sale, grant, lease, or loan. The intent of this assistance is to help nations acquire, maintain, and, if necessary, employ a self-defense capability. The principal objective of security assistance in FID is to establish secure environments in which foreign governments can pursue social, economic, and political initiatives to relieve tensions in their nations and to prevent insurgent or terrorist organizations

from establishing a safe-haven. Although security assistance encompasses far more than FID, it prioritizes FID through logistics, training, and advisory support.

The DOS has the overall responsibility for military and economic security assistance. The DOD administers the military assistance portion, under the direction of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. The Air Force is responsible, as an implementing agency, for those security assistance programs assigned by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). Of the several security assistance programs involving the Air Force, the main programs include foreign military sales and international military education and training (IMET).

Foreign Military Sales

Security assistance organizations (SAOs) are responsible for administering and managing overseas security assistance. The collective term SAO refers to those armed forces organizations permanently assigned to US diplomatic missions to carry out security assistance responsibilities. Air Force elements assigned to SAOs administer and manage Air Force programs and serve under the direction and supervision of the chief of the US diplomatic mission (usually the Ambassador), as provided by law. Commanders should refer to the appropriate directives and publications for additional details on SAO duties. The transfer of all US defense equipment and services must be accomplished under proper statutory authority. When authorized by statute, defense articles or services may at times be provided in accordance with bilateral agreements negotiated to cover a particular program. Negotiation of such assistance agreements is subject to specific requirements for delegation of authority and reporting and requires knowledge of international law, procurement law, and security assistance law.

International Military Education and Training (IMET)

Joint/multinational exercises are conducted to test and evaluate mutual capabilities of US and foreign coalition partners. These exercises, which are predominantly Service-funded, complement security assistance goals by testing and evaluating capabilities that security assistance recipients want to improve. These exercises may include specific types of training and construction, as well as HCA projects, within the host country. Appendix B provides further guidance on exercise objectives, constraints, and funding.

Exchange programs are also a form of a multinational activity having potential FID applications. While some exchanges are authorized under security assistance (unit exchanges and professional military education exchanges), others are not. Individual permanent change of station (PCS) and temporary duty (TDY) exchanges, which are separate from security assistance, are designated as DOD mission functions. These exchanges provide commanders a means to further FID objectives by fostering mutual understanding among multinational forces and by familiarizing each force with the organization, administration, and operations of the other. Theater commanders run individual exchange programs in their areas of responsibility (AOR). Since funding requirements and specific applications vary, commanders seeking authorization for exchanges should consult applicable directives governing requests and coordination procedures. Mutual understanding between Air Force personnel and host-nation forces is

strengthened through orientation visits, doctrine outreach programs, conferences, and joint security consultations. Other initiatives include counternarcotics-funded training of host-nation forces, subject matter exchanges, and various military-to-military contact events. The guidance, conditions, and limitations pertaining to these kinds of initiatives vary considerably. Accordingly, commanders should seek proper legal and administrative guidance prior to execution.

Direct Support (Not Involving Combat)

When it is impractical for the host air force to develop self-sufficiency in time to counter the threat, the Air Force may be tasked to provide direct support that does not commit US personnel to combat. Such support encompasses Service-funded activities that improve host air force effectiveness without duplicating or replacing security assistance efforts to create or maintain host-nation capabilities. Air Force activities at this level normally focus on civil-military operations (CMO), intelligence collection and analysis, logistics support, and other “stand-off” support functions. Air Force activities should emphasize the host military’s combat role. When authorized and directed by the President or Secretary of Defense, Air Force commanders conduct or participate in direct support activities as discussed below.

Exercise Nuevos Horizontes, 2000

Over 2,000 Service members from throughout the United States deployed to El Salvador in February 2000 to participate in Nuevos Horizontes. This exercise was a training mission to exchange experience and knowledge for construction engineers, military police, medical units, and other combat service support units. Four schools and a medical clinic were built and six potable water wells were drilled in the four-month exercise. Physicians, dentists, pharmacists, veterinarians, and preventative medicine instructors conducted training and medical assistance to improve the health and quality of life for El Salvadorans.

The Air Force’s 823rd RED HORSE Squadron, out of Hurlburt Field, established the base camp and poured the foundations for the schools and clinic. The Air Force’s 7th Medical Group served as a medical readiness team and treated up to 600 Salvadoran patients each day during the exercise.

The US Ambassador to El Salvador stated the exercise would be remembered as evidence of US efforts.

—Headquarters 12th Air Force Annual History for 2000

Air Force ISR resources, in conjunction with country team and theater programs and initiatives, can support host-nation IDAD planning through long-range strategic collection and analysis of potential conflict. At the tactical level, Air Force technical search and verification capabilities can complement and augment host-nation collection programs. Intelligence sharing involves providing intelligence products. It does not necessarily mean transferring collection

methods, sources, or technology to the host nation.

Air Force ground and airborne communications resources can support host-nation security forces by providing critical communication capabilities. The Air Force can also provide temporary navigation aids (inserted and operated by special tactics teams, for instance) where host resources are lacking. Such support may include host-nation use of US communication assets, but it does not involve the transfer of communications systems or technology to the host nation. The Air Force maintains control of systems employed in the direct support role and ensures protection of classified communications-computer technology.

Air Force forces and capabilities can support CMO. Civil-military operations are a broad area embracing the relationship between military forces, civilian authorities, and the population and are employed to develop favorable emotions, attitudes, or behavior in neutral, friendly, or hostile groups. The five major areas of CMO, each with important applications in FID, are civil affairs (CA), PSYOP, HA, HCA, and military civic action (MCA). Although the Air Force does not possess CA units, Air Force resources can provide support to joint US civil affairs operations through air mobility and TALCE support, communications backup, information broadcasting, and technical advice on air and space operations.



Search and Rescue Advisory Operations in Ecuador

The inherent psychological effects of air and space power can be employed to further FID objectives through shows of strength and overt demonstrations of support to friends and allies. Specific, stand-alone PSYOP capabilities can be used to support the dissemination of host-government informational programs. Aerial platforms can dispense leaflets or conduct PSYOP broadcasting over standard radio, television, short wave, and military communications bands.

With appropriate authorization and direction, the Air Force can undertake HA independent of joint/multinational exercises or other military operations. Air Force capabilities for HA include personnel evacuation, air mobility, and medical support for disaster victims. Aerial platforms can also support relief activities by broadcasting evacuation instructions and other public information and by temporarily replacing or expanding coverage of existing ground transmitters.

Whereas HA focuses on emergency transportation support and other support to alleviate urgent host-nation needs caused by natural disasters and catastrophes, HCA activities are planned in advance and carried out in conjunction with military operations and exercises. Appendix B contains more detailed information on HCA. MCA can be undertaken along with

security assistance training or as part of traditional theater activities. MCA is essentially a US military-to-host nation military program involving projects undertaken by primarily indigenous forces. Examples include construction, health care, and agriculture projects. Air Force support of MCA is generally limited to training and advisory assistance.

Air Force aerial photography and cartographic services can provide detailed coverage of operating areas to tactical air maneuver components and surface maneuver elements participating in joint/multinational exercises. Maps of developing nations often lack sufficient scale and definition for planning and executing exercises and tactical operations. Air Force support in this area can also be used for testing and evaluating mutual intelligence analysis techniques and procedures. A steady supply of photographs and maps for host-country personnel in quantities larger than that consumed in exercises usually requires security assistance funding.

Air Force meteorological reporting, analysis, forecasting, and interpretation can be employed as part of the direct support effort to enhance host-nation IDAD initiatives. Interpretation of weather data for local effects (rainfall, flooding, wind, visibility, etc.) can be used in a MCA role or applied to host-military planning activities.

Air Force strategic air mobility can be used in the direct support role. Air mobility can be used for delivery, recovery, and resupply of US defense equipment and services, returning security assistance repair items to the United States, transporting host-nation personnel to out-of-country training locations, and providing aeromedical evacuation from main operating bases in the host nation.

Air Force resources may be used in concert with counterdrug activities in countries receiving FID assistance. The DOD, with the Air Force playing a substantial role, is designated lead government agency for detecting and monitoring aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States. Detection and monitoring are performed with Service funds, notwithstanding the possibility of incidental benefit to the host nation. Such activities may include intercept of aircraft, vessels, or vehicles for communications purposes, gathering and processing tactical intelligence from a variety of sources (including fixed and mobile surveillance assets), and intelligence sharing.

Subject to DOD policy and legislative guidance, the Air Force may offer certain types of direct support to host-nation counterdrug personnel. Air Force resources may also provide enhanced support to US civilian law enforcement agencies that may be operating in the region and to the State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics Matters. Combatant commanders within their geographic AOR generally conduct counterdrug activities.

Counterdrug activities, subject to legislative constraints, may involve Air Force capabilities like intelligence sharing; meteorological services; aerial reconnaissance and mapping; air mobility of personnel, supplies and equipment; communications support; counter drug training; upgrading and maintenance of equipment; and the establishment and operation of bases or training sites that facilitate counterdrug activities. However, US forces are prohibited from engaging in direct law enforcement activities unless directed by the President or Secretary

of Defense.

Combat Operations

At higher levels of direct assistance, Air Force resources are capable of supporting joint/multinational combat operations in the host country. Air Force assets can provide tactical mobility for both US and host-nation forces. ISR, attack, and forward air control assets provide capabilities in support of US and host ground and naval forces. Air Force electronic warfare platforms can also provide communications jamming in both standard and military frequency spectrums. See AFDD 2-1, *Air Warfare*, and AFDD 2-3, *Military Operations Other than War*.

CHAPTER FIVE

COMMAND AND CONTROL

Once you've got the cursor over the target you can decide what you want to do. You can kill it, you can save it like we do in humanitarian operations, or you can decide you want to do something more about it.

—General John P. Jumper, CSAF
1 Apr 2004



Air mobility can support many foreign operations

GENERAL

Specific command and control (C2) systems and processes for direct and indirect support vary according to the conflict situation, host-nation requirements, US objectives, and the level of US involvement. C2 systems and processes for security assistance and most forms of direct support not involving combat contain civilian as well as military elements. Air Force security assistance activities overseas are organized under a military command structure within security assistance offices, but both civilian and military elements control and supervise aspects of these activities. Military authorities command, control, and supervise tactical operations in the field.

INDIRECT SUPPORT

The Air Force conducts indirect support in accordance with the guidance contained in statutory authorities and executive orders, as well as directives, regulations, and manuals issued by the DOS and the DOD.

Overseas security assistance organizations respond through two command channels: one through the US diplomatic mission and the other through the unified combatant command. According to public law, executive direction, and DOD directives, all US Government personnel performing security assistance duties in a foreign



Security Assistance Aircraft Delivery and Training in Tunisia

country are under the policy direction and supervision of the chief of mission (i.e., the Ambassador). Commanders and senior officers assigned to SAO positions in foreign countries should be given special training that defines the limits of “policy direction and supervision” and appropriate reporting instructions in military channels when guidance may not be consistent with DOD policy.

Military personnel temporarily assigned to a foreign nation serve under the policy direction, coordination, and supervision of the chief of mission, unless deployed to perform duties directed by the geographic combatant commander. Forces temporarily deployed overseas to accomplish security assistance functions within the geographic area assigned to a combatant command will be attached to that commander. The supported geographic combatant commander normally exercises operational control (OPCON) of these forces. Where practical, temporarily deployed teams should obtain administrative support from the SAO (such as providing appropriate technical, legal, and administrative status in the host nation) under procedural guidance established by the combatant commander and the chief of mission.

DIRECT SUPPORT

Direct FID support not involving combat is authorized and directed on a case-by-case basis by the President or Secretary of Defense. Direct support of this nature is classified as a military mission with respect to command and control responsibilities of the combatant commander in whose AOR the operation is conducted.

Because these activities involve direct employment of air and space resources, military authorities should exercise military C2 over their assigned or attached forces. Sustained operations involving forces from more than one Service should be conducted under the military C2 of a joint task force (JTF) subordinate to the combatant commander. Where short-duration or one-time activities are involved and a JTF is not established, military C2 responsibilities may be executed by the combatant commander directly passing orders through his joint staff. Alternatively, the combatant commander may designate one of his Service component commanders as the commander for a specific mission. In the case of the Air Force, this will be the commander, Air Force forces (COMAFFOR). In any operation, a COMAFFOR will be designated and serve as the commander of assigned and attached Air Force forces.

Deployed AFSOC aviation advisors have routinely been attached to the theater special operations component commander. However the Joint Force Air Component Commander through the combatant commander can also request this capability. Title 10, United States Code (U.S.C.), Section 2011, allows FID units, such as AFSOC’s 6th Special Operations Squadron (SOS) to expend unit operation and maintenance (O&M) funds to train with foreign forces. This legal provision gives the 6 SOS greater flexibility than other military coalition support activities. This flexibility makes the 6 SOS a very attractive and cost effective way for the US to establish relationships. Regardless of who requests the support, the aviation advisors should work for the commander exercising control.

The chief of mission can request direct support and it is generally subject to his or her approval. Coordination of mission requirements, operational constraints, and tasking should take place within the JTF or other designated agencies of the joint command. The Ambassador normally exercises in-country policy supervision and control of the activities.

COMBAT OPERATIONS

As a general rule, Air Force FID forces employed in combat operations should be organized, commanded, and controlled on the basis of guidance established in joint and Air Force doctrine. However, C2 structures may require tailoring to fit specific operational environments, force allocations, and US-host agreements on command of multinational forces.

C2 processes, procedures, and systems are established on the principle of centralized control and decentralized execution and should be configured to meet the requirements of combatant commands and subordinate joint commands. JP 0-2 contains general guidance on joint military operations and the performance of Air Force activities at this level of involvement. If FID assistance expands by introducing selected US combat forces, Air Force forces normally will be assigned or attached to a JTF. The JTF commander will normally exercise OPCON of assigned and attached forces and execute command responsibilities for US forces to ensure unity of effort.

AFSOC forces are normally attached to a JTF as part of a subordinate joint special operations task force (JSOTF) commanded by a joint force special operations component commander (JFSOCC). However, AFSOC performing FID missions may be attached directly to a non-SOF air and space expeditionary task force (AETF) under a COMAFFOR. If FID operations expand into larger combat operations, these AFSOC forces may either remain part of the AETF or be reorganized as part of the JSOTF. COMAFFORs and participants must be prepared for either command relationship.

COORDINATION

Coordination is vital where formal military C2 structures do not identify clear-cut channels of communication among the large numbers of programs, organizations, and individuals involved, particularly between military and civilian agencies. Where military and civilian responsibilities overlap, planning and execution of FID initiatives may require emphasis on close, continuous coordination rather than on command and control as defined in purely military terms.

In many cases, the relationship between agencies is one of interdependence. Combatant commanders, for instance, have functions and responsibilities that go beyond security assistance. SAOs and country teams, with their knowledge of security assistance activities and other foreign aid efforts, serve the combatant commander as important sources of information on host-nation IDAD planning and military preparedness. In addition, combatant commanders have war plans and intelligence at their disposal that may be relevant to security assistance planning and crisis response. These commanders also have assigned forces, TDY personnel, strategic expertise, and materiel resources that can be used in host-nation relations, security assistance, joint-multinational exercises, and certain forms of direct support. They are also in a position to promote interoperability and standardization for multinational operations involving US and host-nation forces.

Coordination arrangements tailored to specific locations and missions benefit not only US diplomatic mission objectives but also the combatant commander's regional security assistance mission. For example, Air Force elements assigned to combatant commands and SAOs (or other country team components) support joint-interagency coordination of air and

space requirements and capabilities for security assistance planning, administration, logistics support, and direct support operations. To accomplish such coordination, Air Force representatives may choose to use an appropriate channel of communication that may, in some instances, extend outside formal coordination procedures. These channels can be used to support combatant commander efforts to help SAOs develop realistic air defense requirements in host countries. They can also be used to keep US diplomatic missions informed about air and space resources and capabilities available for direct support and crisis response.

The Air Force will coordinate direct support activities such as intelligence sharing, PSYOP, and HCA with the theater commander, the US country team, and host-country programs with similar functions and objectives.

JOINT INTERAGENCY OPERATIONS

FID operations are frequently joint operations. Additionally, Air Force FID operations often support other US organizations' objectives. Success of these operations depends on secure and nonsecure communications for tasking, coordinating, monitoring, and reporting among the various US civilian and military agencies. Air Force C2 structures should be tailored to specific environments, missions, and joint force compositions and should be adaptable to varying scenarios. These structures should connect in-country, joint, and interagency elements and should establish links between in-country elements, the combatant commander, and US command and supervisory elements.

MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

US Air Force elements play a key FID role by helping to develop and support multinational C2 capabilities for air and space operations. Multinational activity is inherent in all forms of military FID assistance, and all these forms require links between US and host-nation C2 elements. **Command relationships and responsibilities for multinational exercises and operations are established in accordance with US and host-country agreements.** Connectivity is essential, particularly when US and host-nation forces function in mutual support during combat operations. While connectivity is important, it is also important that interoperability issues be considered in light of the Air Force's need for information assurance.

Significant C2 interoperability challenges in multinational operations typically involve incompatible equipment and standards, language barriers, differing C2 procedures, lack of host-nation experience, and inadequate host-nation logistics infrastructures to maintain modern communications equipment. Equipment modernization and training provided under security assistance can alleviate some of these deficiencies but full interoperability of equipment is difficult to achieve.

CHAPTER SIX

PLANNING

If I always appear prepared, it is because before entering on an undertaking, I have meditated for long and have foreseen what may occur. It is not genius which reveals to me suddenly and secretly what I should do in circumstances unexpected by others; it is thought and preparation.

—Napoleon



GENERAL

This chapter provides general guidance on Air Force planning for both indirect and direct forms of FID. Theater strategies, engagement, and campaign plans should, where appropriate, include FID planning for both forms. The plan defines objectives to be accomplished in pursuit of national strategy and provides subordinate commanders with general force employment guidance. The theater commander bases this guidance on an assessment of employment opportunities and analysis of the relative strengths and weaknesses of friendly and hostile forces. Plans provide joint forces with a concept of operations and establish resource requirements, priorities, channels of communication, and basing modes. Plans for indirect and direct support are extensions of theater strategy and contribute to theater goals and objectives. However, planning for indirect and direct support varies in purpose and execution. Theater engagement plans deal with indirect and many aspects of direct support for FID. Campaign plans address some forms of direct support and combat operations.

Direct-assistance planning for FID primarily involves the employment and logistical support of US forces. Direct support planning guides US military activities and at the same time complements and supports host-nation IDAD programs. Direct support planning does not normally include training and logistics support provided to the host nation, though it may include combat advisors to help host-nation forces execute tactical operations and keep them connected to multinational joint forces at the tactical level. Air and space priorities and tasks established in the plan involve the allocation and apportionment of Air Force aircraft, aircrews, and support resources. Planning may include mobility and employment considerations for allied foreign forces when multinational operations are involved.

Planning for indirect FID assistance, where the principal function of US military operations is to secure US and allied strategic interests, should be directed at logistics support, training, and advisory help to create and sustain the military capabilities of the host nation. Host-military commanders carry out force deployment, employment, and the orchestration of tactical events to accomplish objectives established in the host-nation's IDAD plan. In these cases, the air forces subject to allocation and apportionment for fire and maneuver belong to the host nation. Therefore, joint planning for indirect FID assistance should be the primary guide for

US military commanders and executive agents charged with security assistance and joint-multinational exercise responsibilities. These plans for indirect FID assistance serve US strategic interests by supporting host-nation IDAD programs where such assistance is politically feasible, strategically sound, and logistically supportable.

PLANNING REQUIREMENTS

As a general rule, air and space planning for FID should satisfy the following requirements:

- ✦ **US Air Force FID planning requires a clear statement of air and space objectives in the host nation.** Specifically, what major role (or roles) should air and space power play and what should that role accomplish in furthering the host-nation's IDAD strategy? These objectives, derived from priorities contained in the IDAD plan, should function as the basis for planning various forms of air and space support to the host government.
- ✦ Operational-level air and space planning for FID generally requires extensive cooperation and coordination among a variety of agencies within the joint-multinational-interagency arena. In most cases, combatant commanders and their staffs function as focal points for coordinating indirect as well as direct forms of assistance. In many cases, the planning process requires the direct participation of the supported government and its military forces.
- ✦ Plans establishing guidance and objectives for all types of direct and indirect support should be compatible with host-government IDAD initiatives.
- ✦ Plans should determine principal airpower tools available to air planners specific to the host nation internal threat, operational environment and local conditions. They should identify opportunities to engage insurgent and terrorist targets with the host nation.
- ✦ **US Air Force FID planning should be flexible.** Periodic revisions may be necessary to accommodate alterations in host-nation planning, unanticipated restrictions on US assistance, and significant shifts in conflict intensity and levels of US support.

INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE (ISR) SUPPORT TO FID

Air Force planning for FID operations depends on ISR-derived information. ISR operations support FID by providing early warning of insurgent conflict and by defining the precise nature of the conflict once it has started. The key to effective employment of US ISR assets is early development of essential elements of information (EEI) by combatant commanders, air component commanders, and intelligence analysts. These EEI must be effectively translated into collection requirements for ISR collection resources and methodologies.

Intelligence information provides a foundation for determining appropriate air and space roles and for establishing correct priorities and relationships between military and nonmilitary

options. Because the internal dynamics of insurgency, counterinsurgency, and other forms of internal conflict vary with each situation, FID planning should begin with an analysis of the total conflict environment. ISR requirements are based upon the commander's information requirements and can include risk assessments, analyses of friendly and enemy infrastructures and forces, endemic health threats to deployed personnel, situation reporting, and targeting data. Critical EEI are built from historical analysis and cultural factors; from social, economic, and political components of the conflict; and from the personalities and ambitions of the key players. Early intelligence estimates provide a foundation for establishing proper correlation and priorities among military and nonmilitary air and space roles for both the host nation and US FID forces.

LOGISTICS

Logistics elements play a dominant role in security assistance and form the backbone of indirect Air Force FID assistance. Air Force logistics elements also support US force deployment and specific joint-multinational operations in more direct forms of support. Information developed by Air Force logistics elements through site surveys, joint-multinational exercises, logistics studies, and other assessments supporting security assistance activities may contain significant information for planners. A key step for logistics planning is to understand the host-nation's IDAD strategy and define its aviation requirements and capabilities.

Logistics planning for significant force structure improvements should focus initially on what the host nation intends to do, or can do, for itself. Specifically, how does the host government intend to employ its national resources? What are the immediate and long-range priorities for IDAD? How can Air Force air and space operations support both military and nonmilitary objectives contained in the overall strategy? And finally, what is the host nation's capacity to receive, store, operate, and maintain the air, space, or information resources provided? The host nation's IDAD strategy should be understood and its aviation requirements and capabilities defined before detailed planning commences.

Resource priorities should be aligned with objectives identified in the IDAD plan. Trade-offs may have to be made where funding is limited or resources are limited. These trade-offs should be made after close consideration of the overall US objectives. Logistics planning should take into account the limited logistics infrastructures often prevalent in developing nations and should consider social, economic, and political factors that could enhance or impede Air Force logistics operations.

SECURITY ASSISTANCE SURGE OPERATIONS

Foreign air forces receiving security assistance often possess the nucleus of a counterinsurgency or counterdrug capability but are not able to generate the air support required to meet national emergencies. **Significant improvements can be made in emergency situations through security assistance surge operations. These surge operations often involve new or increased support in equipment transfers, training, advice, and other forms of technical assistance. Where possible, surge operations support should focus on low-cost options to upgrade current host-aviation capabilities.** Where the host nation faces imminent

threat and US interests are at risk, the surge support may include more extensive efforts at increased levels of funding. Security assistance actions are conducted by the appropriate DOD component (not necessarily Service-to-Service). Planners normally coordinate their proposed actions with the Deputy Undersecretary of the Air Force (International Affairs).

Surge requirements for airpower resources and services should be based on assessments and recommendations from country team members (including SAO representatives), Air Force survey teams, and combatant commanders. Because of the extraordinary logistics effort generally required during surges, planning conducted within the security assistance community should be closely coordinated with joint military and civilian defense agencies supporting the transportation and execution phases of the operation. In developing transportation schedules and modes of delivery, including Air Force air mobility, planners should consider such factors as the size of the logistics effort, overall budget constraints, the time limits imposed, and political restrictions on the presence of US military aircraft in the host country.

Surge requirements should be anticipated as early as possible. Some foreign air force organizations may have difficulty absorbing large, rapid infusions of additional security assistance. Surge activities involving additional aircraft, support items, and facilities should be geared to the availability of qualified aircrews and ground support specialists. For this reason, additional aircrew and ground training requirements are often a major planning factor in surge operations. A surge effort, therefore, begins by determining the near-term “build-up” potential of the host air force.

Tactical Air Improvement Plan, Cambodia, 1974 A Surge Operation

In mid 1973, while pulling American combat forces out of Viet Nam, US authorities launched their final strategy in South East Asia--hold the line in Laos and Cambodia until Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) forces, using massive amounts of US-provided military hardware, could defeat the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) in the South. This strategy depended on the Khmer Republic not losing to communist forces, an outcome requiring timely US assistance.

The Khmer Republic's army fought hard, but lacked weapons and supplies. They also lacked air support and it became clear to anyone with experience in Southeast Asia that holding off the Khmer Rouge would take more than artillery-backed infantry employing conventional fire-and-maneuver tactics. The Khmer Republic's army needed aggressive air support: air interdiction to degrade enemy logistics, close air support (CAS) to help defeat Khmer Rouge in contact, and air mobility to give Khmer Republic surface forces an edge in logistics and battlefield maneuver. At the time, the Khmer Air Force (KAF) consisted of personnel only. There were no operational aircraft or functioning maintenance facilities.

Realizing this, the Pentagon's Defense Security Assistance Agency proposed rebuilding the KAF. An Air Force assessment team entered Cambodia in October 1973 to determine the KAF's ability to absorb greatly accelerated deliveries of US defense articles and services. Their findings and recommendations, entitled the Tactical Air Improvement Plan (TAIP): Cambodia, were favorably reviewed by President Nixon and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger. They decided to initiate a security assistance surge operation.

The KAF received one squadron of AT-28 attack aircraft, one squadron of C-123 transports, one squadron of AC-47 gunships, one squadron of O-1D forward air control aircraft, and one squadron of AU-24 Helio Stallion Light Armed Utility Short Take-Off and Land (LAUSTOL) aircraft. The surge included all support items and services including training, fuel, munitions, aircraft spare parts, and the complete refurbishment of a squadron of UH-1H helicopters. KAF combat aircrews successfully employed their newly acquired aircraft with great effect throughout the range of assigned airpower tasks and missions

In the face of a highly motivated and determined foe, Cambodia fell to communist forces in the spring of 1975. While overall US strategy in the region did not succeed, the TAIP helped stave off defeat and preserved the Khmer Republic for a number of months—months it would not have had without a security assistance surge operation. Although it only partially achieved its objectives, the TAIP helped prove the future viability of surge operations.

**—Jerome W. Klingaman, Director of Strategy and Plans
6th Special Operations Squadron**

The long-term implications of major force structure changes in the host air force should be considered during surge planning activities. A near-term payoff in operational capability should be weighed against anticipated post-surge funding levels and long-term requirements within the host nation. The potential for the perception of a lack of support following surge operations should be addressed.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS (PSYOP)

PSYOP and FID operations can be complementary and produce synergistic effects. There are two major aspects of PSYOP planning. Obviously, PSYOP planning should be accomplished for those FID activities primarily initiated for psychological effect. Additionally, PSYOP planning should be included in all FID activities, even when those activities are not primarily designed for psychological effect. Operations and logistics planners at all levels of command should carefully consider the psychological implications of any Air Force action involving direct or indirect support to a foreign government. Accordingly, PSYOP planning should be closely tied to all-source intelligence on friendly and hostile elements. FID planners should also anticipate enemy psychological operations directed at Air Force operations in the

host nation. Operations likely to generate counterpropaganda operations requirements should be coordinated with appropriate public affairs and host-country information agencies.

CIVIL AFFAIRS (CA)

In some circumstances, US Army or Marine Corps CA augmentation teams may be needed to support Air Force elements deployed overseas on FID operations. **FID planners should identify requirements for CA support early in the planning process.** CA teams can assist in preparing overseas bases and facilities by securing local acceptance and support of Air Force operations. CA teams can also assist deployed Air Force forces by providing information on local civilian attitudes, culture, religions, ethics, infrastructure, and conflict dynamics in the area of operations.

SIMULATION AND GAMING

Simulation and gaming may be used to facilitate planning for FID. Success of air and space operations in FID often depends directly on the planner's ability to assess a broad range of complex, mutually related problems involving human and technological factors. Simulation and gaming based on country-specific models are tools for identifying these factors and for developing and testing appropriate air and space roles and operations and for security assistance initiatives, as well as direct support options.

CHAPTER SEVEN

EMPLOYMENT

An educated guess is just as accurate and far faster than compiled errors.

—General George Patton



GENERAL

The basic tenets of air and space power and the principles of war provide fundamental guidance for employing Air Force FID forces. These principles apply equally to indirect and direct forms of assistance. US and supported allied commanders should practice unity of command, create economy of force, and use maneuver to achieve desired objectives. As with their US counterparts, allied commanders should be able to employ air and space forces as mutually supporting, integrated systems capable of functioning synergistically with surface operations. Commanders should tailor their own efforts to specific conflict situations, objectives, and priorities. Direct and indirect efforts should be mutually supporting and integrated with defense and employment efforts on the ground.

INDIRECT SUPPORT

Air Force **security assistance** efforts should focus on defense equipment and services that reduce host-nation dependency on continuous in-country supervision and support by the United States. Recipient nations' personnel should be trained to operate and maintain the systems provided. In some cases, they should also be shown how to employ these systems for specific operations. As host-nation proficiency in air operations improves, developing internal training capabilities within host-aviation units can reduce dependence on in-country Air Force assistance.

Resource mobilization plays a crucial role in combatting terrorism, insurgency, and other forms of lawlessness and violence. Besides helping to provide US defense equipment and services to the host nation, Air Force logistics personnel should advise host-nation authorities on the use of airpower to establish and sustain IDAD programs through aerial lines of supply and personnel movement.

To overcome sustainability problems inherent in maintaining older generation aircraft and systems, Air Force security assistance operations may also include administration and logistics support of nonstandard items.

FID-provided Training

FID-provided training includes development of basic skills in flight operations, logistics, intelligence, communications, weather, health support services, and other support functions. Specialized training should be used to provide foreign personnel a means of applying these basic skills to specific problems affecting internal security in their countries. Such training directly supports internal, host-nation solutions to the conflict, thus decreasing the likelihood of a larger US military role.

Operational training should be conducted jointly where practical. Joint training offers major advantages in developing common understandings among host-military services of requirements, capabilities, limitations, and procedures. Multinational participation lays the groundwork for future contacts between US and host-country personnel by establishing mutual understanding of FID-IDAD requirements and objectives.



Aircraft Maintenance Advisory Operations in Ecuador (circa 1993)

Security Assistance Teams

Air Force security assistance teams supplement SAO capabilities by providing training, advice, and technical assistance to recipient nations. The teams, funded under security assistance, vary in size and composition. Air Force personnel may deploy as an Air Force team or function as the air component of a larger joint effort. When the operation involves training or advisory efforts aimed at developing joint tactics, techniques, and procedures, teams should include Air Force members and members from the other US Services when appropriate. **Commanders should always consult applicable Service and DOD publications for specific policies, procedures, and guidance on using survey and assessment activities before employing them.** Appendix C has additional details on security assistance efforts.

Combatant commands may employ Air Force security assistance teams for limited support on technical training in the operation and maintenance of specific systems. **The principal criteria for team selection are competence in the specialty requested, teaching skills, and language compatibility with host-nation recipients.** When training and advisory assistance teams are required to provide guidance on planning, developing, and employing air and space power, teaching skills in one technical specialty are rarely sufficient.

US military training and advisory teams should be appropriately sized and structured. The size and composition of these teams should be sufficient to address the major deficiencies that affect the host air force. Trainers and advisors should also be able to recognize potential air

and space applications in a given internal conflict. They should understand the means and possible limitations of integrating air and space operations into the host-nation's social, economic, psychological, political, and joint military initiatives.

Country teams or combatant commanders normally initiate in-country support requirements, which should be based on recommendations derived from surveys and assessments. This approach anticipates the problem of a team deploying overseas to develop or improve operational capabilities of a particular weapon system when the host air force lacks the infrastructure or resources to employ the system effectively.

Surveys on security assistance support of FID should include three basic tasks. The first task is to determine appropriate air and space roles and operations for the given conflict or preconflict situation. Second, the team then conducts an assessment of the host-nation's ability to fulfill these roles with existing air and space resources. Finally, the team develops requirements and recommendations for improvements that can be carried out through host-nation initiatives or through additional US assistance.

Training and equipment provided to the host nation may not be sufficient to ensure the success of aviation programs in some conflict situations. When authorized and directed by appropriate legal authority, Air Force advisory personnel may also be employed to advise host air force units on how to employ air-support resources in a manner that serves the combined interests of the United States and the host nation.

There is an important difference between training and advising. Training can provide a doctrinal or procedural foundation for military operations. Advising involves the practical application of operational doctrine or tactics, techniques, and procedures to actual situations in the host country. Advising is situation-specific and situation-dependent.

Advice on air and space application is often most effective when applied at top decision-making levels within the host government. Advice on strategic matters, operational-level planning, joint operations, and the integration of multiple governmental agencies is appropriately directed at higher levels of the military command structure. In addition, advisory efforts may have a more lasting effect and can carry considerably more weight when acted upon by senior members of the host military.

Advisors should help host commanders apply an operational-level perspective to such issues as air base planning and construction, logistics, intelligence, command and control, and training. Field advisors should help local subordinate commanders ensure that tactical air



Airborne Operations and Combat Advisory Support

support planning follows joint operational-level guidance and that tactical operations are properly coordinated and integrated with other military and civil activities. Besides providing technical assistance on operating and maintaining US defense articles, field advice should focus on such issues as air base security and operability, resource conservation, munitions safety, and ground-handling procedures. Advisors also should help host air force commander's focus on the political and psychological implications of combat operations.

Air Force advisors are often in the best position to identify requirements for additional security assistance efforts or more direct forms of support because of their close contact with in-country IDAD operations. When tasked by proper authorities, they should coordinate US direct support activities with host authorities at command and field levels and help analyze and interpret US-provided intelligence.



USAF aviation advisors from AFSOC's 6th Special Operations Squadron conduct aircrew preflight training with the Philippine Air Force.

Air Force Special Operations Combat Aviation Advisory

FID is a principal mission assigned by law to United States special operations forces (SOF). AFSOC maintains combat aviation advisors (CAA) who possess specialized FID skills and capabilities. CAA teams, organized into operational aviation detachments (OAD), assess, train, advise, and assist foreign aviation forces in tactical and operational-level airpower employment and sustainment. Tactical OAD-A teams facilitate the availability, reliability, safety, and interoperability of air combat and combat support forces and help integrate those forces into joint and multinational operations throughout the range of military operations. CAA teams train, advise, and assist foreign aviation units in air combat tactics, techniques, and procedures as well as aircraft maintenance, logistics, air base defense, command and control, flight medicine, and personal survival. These teams also advise and assist geographic combatant commanders, subordinate commands, civilian agencies, and foreign military commands on planning and integrating foreign aviation forces into theater campaign plans and contingencies and other joint and multinational activities. OAD-B teams provide infrastructure support to multiple-deployed OAD-A teams. Each aviation advisor possesses a record of functional expertise in their area as well as language or cross-cultural skills. The unique ability to provide broad-based airpower expertise along with regional expertise is what distinguishes combat aviation advisory operations from other military activities.

Combat Aviation Advisory – From Past to Present

More than thirty years ago, Air Commandos of the Air Force Special Operations Force trained and advised foreign aviation forces around the world in the use of airpower to counter communist-sponsored “wars of national liberation.” That advisory capability was lost at the end of the war in Southeast Asia, and global conflicts eventually morphed themselves into other forms—radical nationalist movements and separatist insurrections, state-sponsored terrorism, syndicated narco violence, and regional warfare.

In October, 1994, the Air Force reactivated one of its original air commando units, the 6th Special Operations Squadron (6 SOS), to join forces with Army Special Forces and Navy SEALs to work with foreign counterparts in countering these evolving threats. Today, the wartime mission of the 6th Special Operations Squadron is to assess, train, advise, and assist foreign aviation forces in airpower employment, sustainment, and force integration in three interrelated mission areas: foreign internal defense (FID), unconventional warfare (UW), and coalition support (CS). When conducting tactical training and advisory operations, 6 SOS personnel focus on facilitating the availability, reliability, safety, and interoperability of host-nation (HN) aviation resources supporting joint and multinational operations.

This mission carries over into training and advising foreign aviation combat and combat support units in logistics sustainment, airbase defense, command and control, survival, and other functions supporting air operations. The 6 SOS also helps combatant commanders and civilian agencies plan and integrate foreign air operations into theater campaign plans, contingencies, and other joint and multi-national activities.

**—Jerome W. Klingaman, Director of Strategy and Plans
6th Special Operations Squadron**

DIRECT SUPPORT

Air Force direct support capabilities can be employed at varying levels of conflict intensity to enhance or supplement host-aviation programs. The Air Force should maintain a proper balance between direct and indirect forms of assistance. Balanced assistance will help preserve host self-sufficiency and legitimacy. The direct support effort should be swift and decisive at the point of contact; however they should not, through excessive momentum, cause that transition to occur or lead to self-generating requirements for increasingly higher levels of US military involvement. Finally, direct support should not, through excessive application, undermine the host-nation's will or capacity to achieve an internal solution to the crisis.

Host air and space requirements may exceed the objectives and limitations of security assistance and joint-multinational exercises. At the same time, a US combat role may also be tactically inappropriate or politically infeasible as a FID instrument. To satisfy some of these requirements at acceptable levels of commitment and risk, Air Force resources can be employed in a variety of direct support roles that bridge the gap between indirect assistance and combat operations.

Direct noncombat support does not eliminate all risks. However, it does offer a means of providing specialized assistance to a host country without intentionally exposing US personnel to hostile fire. **Direct Air Force involvement in such activities as HCA and MCA obviously requires the physical presence of Air Force personnel working in close contact with friendly elements.** However, for some operations like ISR collection and PSYOP, it may be possible to conduct operations from outside the recipient country when there are political or operational constraints on the presence of Air Force assets on foreign installations. Clandestine, covert, or low-visibility techniques and procedures in politically sensitive or denied areas may also be required for combat operations. Commanders should consider the use of Air Force special operations forces to conduct these kinds of operations if required.

A central objective of combat operations is to protect vital resources and to buy time for the host government to stabilize its social, economic, and political institutions. The Air Force role here is supportive only. It is not designed to capture the strategic initiative or to transfer strategic responsibilities from the host government to the United States. To preserve its legitimacy and achieve a lasting, internal solution to the conflict, the host government must carry full responsibility for the strategic offensive.

FORCE PROTECTION

Force protection for FID applies to deployed operational units supporting host-nation IDAD programs. Force protection for aviation units and contingency support elements falls within the context of air base and site defense. Commanders must exercise force protection to ensure the defense and survival of personnel, facilities, C2 structures, weapon systems, and logistics. Specific force protection guidance is in AFDD 2-4.1, *Force Protection*.

CHAPTER EIGHT

TRAINING

If training or exercises do not reflect realism, the stress and challenges of actual conditions, then our Airmen will not be prepared when they are called upon to execute their mission. Training programs must be aligned with expected outcomes and provide realistic experience to greatly improve skill competency. Stress, unpredictability, fatigue, night operations, adverse weather, simulated equipment breakdowns, and chemical and biological contamination are examples of the challenges our men and women will face in the field and should be trained to overcome.

**Air Force Doctrine Document 1-1,
Leadership and Force Development**



Basic training prepares airmen for realistic conditions worldwide.

GENERAL

To accomplish its FID mission, the Air Force employs a broad range of basic skills in air and space operations, maintenance, management, and administration. It also trains Air Force and other DOD personnel for duties specifically related to the application of these skills in FID. The following guidance addresses FID training objectives and requirements, instructional methods, types of training, and training sources.

Courses of instruction should be tailored to fit user and operator requirements and should be administered to students before their assumption of FID duties. Where possible, training should be properly sequenced with general education and career development.

Under the provisions of 10 U.S.C. 2011—“Special Operations Forces may train and/or train with foreign armed forces and security personnel with O&M funds.” This explicitly includes all SOF, including psychological operations and civil affairs. The purpose for enactment of this legislation is own-force training, not to render foreign assistance or to conduct FID/IDAD. The Senate Armed Services Committee report supporting this legislation states further that: “Special operations forces who are trainers must practice training. One of the most effective ways in which they can improve their training methods is to practice training in countries in which they may have to fight or train local forces in a contingency.” Moreover, “Host-nation benefit is recognized as an outcome of such training, but it is described as ‘indirect’ and ‘unavoidable.’” The report and the law state specifically, “The primary purpose of the training shall be to train US special operations forces.”

TYPES OF TRAINING

Commanders preparing FID forces for overseas deployment should coordinate with supported agencies to determine the types and depth of training required for specific activities and locations.

General familiarization in such areas as operational environments, uses of military force, and air and space functions and operations provides Air Force personnel a broad conceptual framework for planning and executing FID operations. This training has extensive application for all FID participants and serves as the introduction to more specialized forms of instruction.

Air Force personnel deploying overseas for FID should receive specialized training commensurate with their assigned duties in such areas as foreign languages, area orientation, foreign training and advising techniques, force protection, tactical communications, advanced weapons, personal survival, cross-cultural communications, antiterrorism, counterdrug operations, and the principles of IDAD planning. This training is especially important for security assistance managers, trainers, and combat aviation advisors. Deployed forces performing direct support activities may require such subjects as combat weapons and their employment, field craft, and PSYOP.

In selected cases, Air Force personnel should receive technical training on specific FID assignments and responsibilities. Security assistance trainers or advisors, for instance, may require technical instruction on operating and maintaining nonstandard weapon systems and support equipment. Supplemental instruction or cross-training in such areas as logistics, intelligence, communications, and civil-military operations can be used to increase the effectiveness and flexibility of deployed Air Force elements, especially in situations demanding a minimal presence of US personnel.

TRAINING SOURCES

A variety of FID-related instructional programs are available to Air Force personnel. Additional FID training is available through other US Military Departments and civilian agencies via inter-Service or interagency support agreements. Service academies and professional military education programs should be employed as sources of general education in FID matters. Civilian universities and colleges also have area studies and other instructional programs. Further, the joint special operations establishment provides both general education and specialized training in insurgency-counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, and function as the principal source of specialized FID instruction on air and space matters for deployed Air Force security assistance teams and direct support elements. Finally, various civilian departments, agencies, and independent establishments of the US Government are potential sources of specialized and technical instruction in such areas as intelligence, PSYOP, counterdrug, civil and military law enforcement, civic action, nation assistance, nation building, country team operations, and public information programs.

At the Very Heart of Warfare Lies Doctrine...

APPENDIX A

INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY

GENERAL

This appendix provides Air Force commanders, trainers, advisors, and other personnel involved in FID a basic framework for understanding and evaluating the major components of insurgency and counterinsurgency. The discussion on counterinsurgency focuses on the major functions and objectives of a host nation's IDAD strategy.

ANALYZING INSURGENCY

Because insurgencies vary greatly in form, scope, and intensity, it is impossible to construct a universal model for this type of conflict. However, there are many elements that can be analyzed to determine the composition and likely direction of an insurgent movement. The way an insurgency is inspired, organized, and employed should be of principal interest to FID planners. Typically, insurgency incorporates an ideological content that furnishes a revolutionary theory and cause; a revolutionary infrastructure providing leadership, organization, logistics, communications, and intelligence; and a militant arm to defend the revolutionary movement and help achieve its political objectives. Understanding these elements allows those defending against the insurgency to focus on the cause of the revolution and to direct their campaign against root causes and supporting infrastructure as well as the insurgent's military forces. To devise appropriate countermeasures, including the use of air and space power, defense planners should also analyze the insurgent's strategy—the goals and likely methods of attack.

Ideological Content

Poverty, class oppression, political disenfranchisement, and ethnic or religious strife often furnish the necessary conditions for revolution, but they are rarely sufficient to generate armed conflict. Given economic and political grievances, another condition must be met. A catalyst must be furnished to draw attention to these grievances and focus them on the failure of the state to act in the best interests of the people. The catalyst originates in the ideological content of the revolution (Marxism or religion, for example). Together, the grievances and the ideological content function as necessary conditions to set the revolution in motion. Ideology is the mechanism for connecting the population with the central ideas and goals of the revolutionary movement. It defines the economic and political future of the revolutionary state and provides the inspirational basis for revolt. The ideological underpinnings of a revolution may extend beyond the legitimate needs and aspirations of the people. Insurgents bent on achieving power at any cost often view government reforms as a threat to their political ambitions.

Revolutionary Infrastructure

Revolutionary infrastructure furnishes the organizational devices to administer and control all social, economic, informational, political, and military initiatives. Leaders, located at the infrastructure's center, formulate strategic plans, policies, and goals. They are the source of political-ideological order and discipline. In many revolutions, political cadres located throughout the organizational structure represent party leadership. Overall, the infrastructure functions as the heart of the insurgent organization's command and control system.

The infrastructure is often organized into interconnected, clandestine cells responsible for recruitment, training, intelligence, deception, propaganda, and logistics. C2 lines extend to insurgent military elements and, where possible, to agents located in various segments of local and national government, host military organizations, and society at large. Insurgents may conduct political action and psychological operations through legal front organizations such as labor unions, organized student groups, and registered political parties.

The infrastructure is often a coalition of factions with differing grievances, ideological patterns, and political agendas. When faction leaders differ significantly over revolutionary ends, ways, or means, internal alliances are often dynamic and extremely fragile. The nature of these alliances—their dominant political direction and degree of cohesion—is an important indicator of the nature of the revolution, its strategic goals, strengths, and weaknesses.

Insurgent Strategy

Usually insurgent strategy is carried out on multiple fronts (through social, economic, informational, political, and military initiatives) to separate the government from the population and to neutralize the government's self-defense mechanisms. The contest is for legitimacy and, where possible, political mobilization of the people. Mobilization furnishes the revolution with workers, fighters, money, weapons, and intelligence, while at the same time denying these assets to the government. By neutralizing the government's authority through the use of propaganda and force, the insurgent creates opportunities to implant forms of political and economic control of the population. The strategy is ultimately aimed at "out-administering" the host government. Although the insurgent does not necessarily require the active participation of the majority of the population, the insurgent secures neutrality or passive support.

Military Operations

The insurgent movement usually enters armed conflict with a small guerrilla force that increases in strength as personnel and weapons become available. The insurgents fight as guerrillas because they lack the means to apply force quickly and decisively in open battle with defending conventional forces. The insurgents usually begin with little of the materiel and manpower resources available to the government. They avoid all-out confrontations, relying instead on accumulating smaller successes to achieve social, economic, psychological, and political objectives.

Guerrilla tactics extend the revolution with the means available, wearing down the host

nation's financial and materiel resources and also the political and moral resolve of foreign friends and allies supporting the counterinsurgency effort. By interdicting vital lines of communication, halting or slowing agricultural production, and inhibiting domestic and foreign trade, the insurgency reduces the government's financial ability to resist. Successful interdiction of economic targets also undermines the legitimacy of the government by creating inflation, higher taxes, and critical shortages of goods and services. Insurgents may also employ terrorism or terrorist techniques (e.g., assassination, kidnapping, extortion, and blackmail) as a tactical instrument to suppress or inhibit government actions. Selective attacks against industrial facilities, transportation systems, government officials, and civil law enforcement agencies may have significant psychological effect, primarily in discrediting the host government's ability to manage and administer the affairs of state.

Guerrilla tactics may also function as a crucial lead-in phase to conventional operations aimed at defeating the government's main forces. In many instances, national security forces are driven into their most defensible positions during the protracted guerrilla phase. This withdrawal provides insurgents time and secures maneuvering space to consolidate their political and economic control in rural areas. It also gives them time to establish their legitimacy and to assemble a larger, more conventionally structured force capable of making decisive, final assaults on government garrisons. When the defending forces become isolated in static positions, the government's chances of success are poor.

Phased Actions

Insurgency is usually a progressive, evolutionary process marked by a series of phases corresponding to major transitions in the revolutionary movement. Although insurgencies can take many forms, three phases are common to many: a prehostility or incipient phase, a guerrilla warfare phase, and a conventional confrontation phase.

- ★ Phase I corresponds to infrastructure development plus initial recruiting, organizing, training, and equipping of combat elements. During this phase, insurgents may engage the government in open political confrontations like public demonstrations, labor strikes, and boycotts. Insurgents often establish secure base areas for military command elements and guerrilla operations during this phase. Political-ideological cadres focus on indoctrination of civilians and armed revolutionaries.
- ★ Phase II is the first level of armed violence. Irregular forces engage in sabotage, interdiction of communication and logistics links, assassination, and selective attacks against government forces. Insurgents expand their secure base areas and, where possible, link them to form strategic enclaves of political autonomy.
- ★ Phase III marks the transition from guerrilla actions to operations incorporating the tactics, techniques, and procedures of conventional fire and maneuver.

The reference to conflict phases is only a means of identifying critical shifts in the scope and intensity of insurgent activity. Phases may not signify a clean break between one kind of

activity and another and may not apply in every conflict. For example, infrastructure development is a continuous process of expanding administration, command and control, training, and employing mobilized resources. Mobilization of insurgent combat forces must continuously expand to carry the insurgency from one phase to the next. Similarly, guerrilla operations may carry over into the conventional confrontation phase as a force multiplier. Also, an insurgency does not have to progress through all three phases to succeed. A critical combination of political, economic, psychological, and military pressures may be sufficient to precipitate a government's collapse or persuade a government's foreign backers to withdraw at any stage of a conflict. In Afghanistan's war against Soviet occupation, operations essentially started in Phase II and never progressed to Phase III before Soviet forces withdrew and the government they supported collapsed.

A revolutionary movement is most vulnerable to government countermeasures during the initial build-up phase, before the insurgent develops military forces. Once the insurgency takes up armed combat, government countermeasures become far more complicated and difficult to apply. Insurgent warfare is, however, reversible. Reversibility can work to the advantage of either side in the conflict. If an insurgency fails militarily in one phase, it can revert to a lower phase, thus securing its survival while generating or reinforcing combat capabilities. The government, on the other hand, may be able to capitalize on reduced levels of military activity to focus on solutions aimed at rooting out the infrastructure and eliminating economic and political grievances that may fuel the revolution.

COUNTERINSURGENCY

Countering a revolutionary strategy focused on political or ideological mobilization and protracted violence requires a wide range of social, economic, informational, political, and military initiatives. No single government initiative is sufficient, particularly when the insurgents are able to bind political-ideological goals with genuine grievances. The government's initiatives should be taken simultaneously and should reinforce each other. These initiatives require all instruments of national power be combined into a single, integrated IDAD program using both military and civilian resources. An effective IDAD strategy emphasizes unity of effort, maximum use of intelligence, minimum use of violence, and responsive government leadership and administration. Ideally, the IDAD strategy should be used early enough to prevent an insurgency, but it can also be employed to counter an insurgency that has already started. The strategy incorporates four major tasks—balanced development, mobilization, security, and neutralization.

Balanced Development

Balanced development attempts to create a social, economic, and political environment resistant to revolutionary attack. It does this through reforms aimed at removing or alleviating sources of legitimate grievance that can be exploited by revolutionary elements. Although the scope and detail of the reforms vary from country to country, their principal functions are to establish the defending regime's legitimacy, capture the political initiative from the revolutionary movement, and mobilize public support of IDAD efforts. In some cases, balanced development may require major investments in the industrial and agricultural sectors. However, economic

development should be balanced with equally important nation-building initiatives in such areas as human rights, legal process, public education, communications, health care, transportation, utilities, water, and other public service programs. The host military often possesses unique capabilities in transportation, communications, and manpower that can be employed in nation-building programs.

Balanced development is always important, but the form it takes should be driven by the nature of the conflict. In conflicts where the insurgency is inspired by economic grievances or class oppression, economic development may be very effective, whereas insurgencies based primarily on longstanding cultural, ethnic, or religious discord may respond better to other forms of nation building, like human rights and other political reforms.

Mobilization

The government mobilizes the population to participate in IDAD efforts. Mobilization maximizes manpower, materiel resources, political support, and intelligence available to the government while denying these resources to the insurgent. The net effect of mobilization is a social-political environment in which the government can "out-administer" the leadership and control mechanisms of the revolutionary movement. Mobilization relies heavily on informational instruments to instill public confidence in the government and to reduce anxiety over military initiatives.

Security

Security includes all activities to protect the population, the government, and vital economic resources from insurgent violence. Security provides a safe environment for balanced development and denies the enemy access to popular support. The ability of internal security forces to maintain law and order is a key factor in demonstrating the government's legitimacy. During the early stages of insurgency, civil law enforcement agencies should function as a major line of defense for internal security. Revolution's major dynamic—political mobilization—occurs at the grass-roots level, and the government agency closest to that level is the local police. Police are generally the first to detect critical signs of unrest, particularly in rural areas, and they are often closest to important sources of HUMINT on infrastructure organization and methods. They also provide a nucleus for establishing local auxiliaries and paramilitary forces. In some instances, civilian security forces are more acceptable to the local populace than the military. Military participation may begin with lateral support or augmentation of the police during low levels of violence and increase to a direct combat posture if the insurgency escalates.

Neutralization

Neutralization is physically and psychologically separating insurgents from the population. It includes all lawful activities to disrupt, disorganize, and defeat insurgent organizations. Neutralization thus enlarges the objectives of security to include eliminating sources of insurgent violence. Neutralization relies on civil law enforcement agencies as well as military forces to accomplish these objectives.

The principal targets of neutralization are the insurgents' leadership and control elements. These elements are often deeply embedded in the civilian sector, operating clandestinely or under the protective cover of legitimate institutions. In most cases, penetrating and rooting out leadership and control elements can be done more effectively with legal, informational, and civil law enforcement and investigative instruments than with military forces.

Neutralization also requires internal defense forces that are organized, trained, and equipped for joint combat operations. Military force, however, is rarely decisive in determining long-term strategic outcomes. Defeating the insurgent militarily may drive the conflict to a lower phase of violence or drive it underground, but it does not eliminate the social, economic, political, or cultural tensions fueling the insurgency. Military force should be aimed at holding the conflict at the lowest possible level of violence while the government eliminates the insurgents' infrastructure and engages in balanced development and reform. Force is not an end in itself. It is only a way to buy time until the processes of reform and nation building take effect.

The reversible, multiphase nature of revolutionary conflict requires great flexibility in planning and executing military operations. Tactics, techniques, and procedures appropriate for conventional confrontations may be ineffective, even counterproductive, when executing military operations during counterinsurgency operations. Because of varying situations and force requirements, decision makers and planners require accurate, timely intelligence to facilitate the process of selecting proper options.

The social, psychological, and political implications of military actions, particularly those employing deadly force, should be clearly understood and correctly exploited by the defending government. Excessive or ineffective use of force erodes government legitimacy and promotes political mobilization in favor of the insurgents. Even when the government assumes special emergency powers through legislation or decree, security forces must provide for the safety of law-abiding citizens.

APPENDIX B

JOINT-MULTINATIONAL EXERCISES

GENERAL

This appendix establishes objectives and considerations that apply during joint-multinational exercises. Coincidental with testing and evaluating mutual capabilities, joint-multinational exercises may include certain types of training and construction, as well as HCA projects, within the host country. Although the exercises may be conducted between Air Force and the host air force units only, maximum utility is realized when they involve joint as well as multinational operations.

INTEROPERABILITY AND SAFETY TRAINING

Interoperability and safety training are significant aspects of joint-multinational exercises.

Interoperability Training

The purpose of interoperability training is to ensure that DOD and host-nation forces can function as mutually supporting entities during multinational combat operations. Training to achieve interoperability should include doctrine; tactics; individual skills; weapons familiarization (particularly if US and host forces use different weapon systems); maintenance; and procedures for command, control, communications, and computers.

Interoperability training assumes that comparably proficient units are involved. The training experience allows US commanders to learn how other forces conduct IDAD operations and to develop the most compatible methodology, consistent with US FID policies and objectives, for operating together.

If the foreign force is not proficient enough to conduct multinational operations with US forces, foreign military sales (FMS) training provided under security assistance should be conducted to equalize the foreign force before multinational exercises are undertaken.

Joint-multinational exercises are not to be used to provide training to foreign military personnel if that training is normally provided under security assistance.

Safety Training

Safety training reduces the risks inherent in conducting military operations by two or more forces differing widely in language, culture, geographic origin, technology, and practical experience. Mutual safety is improved not only through training in the use of specific weapons but also through standardization of tactics, techniques, and procedures.

CONSTRUCTION

Construction related to multinational exercises is permitted under two sets of rules—one set for Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) exercises and another set for non-JCS exercises.

JCS Exercises

Set-aside funds contained in the unspecified minor construction account of each US military Service will pay for all exercise-related construction during JCS exercises. Set-aside funds cover only material, supplies, nonmilitary labor costs, overhead (except planning and design costs), and DOD-funded costs applicable to O&M of equipment. O&M funds may not be used for construction related to JCS exercises.

Non-JCS Exercises

During non-JCS exercises O&M funds may be used to construct or improve facilities under US control, if each construction project results in a complete, usable facility necessary for US units to take part in the multinational exercise. Strict project rules and precise funding limits are established for such construction.

HUMANITARIAN AND CIVIC ASSISTANCE

HCA projects that are conducted predominantly by US personnel may be performed in conjunction with exercises or military operations. HCA is rendered to the local populace. US governing authority prohibit HCA—directly or indirectly—to any military or paramilitary activity.

Authority

HCA is provided under separate authorities established in Comptroller General opinions and legislation that:

- ✦ Recognize DOD's inherent ability to undertake HCA activities while fulfilling the training needs of the unit involved, which incidentally create humanitarian benefit to the local populace.
- ✦ Permit authorized DOD personnel to conduct HCA activities that are unrelated to training requirements by using minimal expenditures of Service funds in conjunction with JCS-directed or JCS-coordinated exercises overseas.
- ✦ Recognize DOD's ability to carry out HCA on a reimbursable basis for another US Government agency with authority and appropriations to conduct such activities. This is referred to as an interagency transaction or economy act transaction. During FID operations, such a transaction usually occurs when the United States Agency for International

Development funds economic-assistance type activities under Part I, Developmental Assistance, of the Foreign Assistance Act.

- ✦ Authorize certain types of HCA activities in conjunction with military operations (not necessarily exercises). This is a statutory authority referred to as either the Combatant Commander's Cooperative Program or 10 U.S.C. 401, Humanitarian Assistance and Other Assistance Authority.

FORMS OF HCA

There are three distinct forms of HCA with important applications in FID-related joint-multinational exercises—Statutory HCA, De Minimus (or Minimal) HCA, and Stevens HCA. Commanders contemplating the use of HCA should seek legal advice on the form of HCA most appropriate for the operation or exercise being conducted, especially with respect to rules governing HCA limitations and funding.

Statutory HCA. This is carried out in conjunction with authorized military operations, such as JCS-directed or coordinated exercises and single-Service deployments for training, and is funded from specifically appropriated Program 10 (host-nation support) O&M funds. The Secretary of State must provide prior approval for DOD to conduct this form of HCA, and the activities should be closely coordinated with State Department personnel in country.

- ✦ The activities should complement, not duplicate, other assistance provided by the United States and enhance the security interests of both the United States and the host nation. The activities should also enhance the operational skills of US military personnel.
- ✦ Although the authority prohibits funding to construct airstrips, Air Force airlift resources may be employed to support joint US HCA elements engaged in construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems, drilling wells and constructing basic sanitation facilities, and rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities. Further, Air Force personnel and resources may also provide or support medical, dental, and veterinary care in rural areas of a country.

De Minimus HCA. This is also carried out along with authorized military operations, but consists of activities for which only minimal expenditures may be incurred. Such HCA is funded from Program 2 (General Purpose) O&M funds and is not subject to the requirements of Statutory HCA. An example of De Minimus HCA activities described by Congress includes a unit doctor's examination of villagers for a few hours, with the administration of a few shots and the issuance of some medicine, but not the deployment of a medical team for the purpose of providing mass inoculations to the local populace. Another example is the opening of an access road for several hundred yards but not the asphaltting of any roadway.

Stevens HCA. This provides that Program 2 O&M funds may be used to pay costs incurred in providing HCA incidental to authorized military operations. Stevens HCA is limited to JCS-directed or coordinated exercises.

- ★ Stevens HCA must complement, not duplicate, other assistance provided by the United States and enhance the security interests of both the United States and the host nation. It must enhance the operational skills of US military personnel and must be "incidental" in nature. Incidental HCA are those activities that are "minor" when viewed in the context of the overall exercise scenario in which they occur.
- ★ Stevens HCA activities must be provided as an incidental benefit to a comprehensive training program. They cannot be designed as stand-alone civic action programs or as major exercise activities in their own right. Accordingly, commanders must determine what amount of incremental O&M cost associated with HCA would be reasonable in view of the overall amount of O&M funds to be expended in the JCS-directed or coordinated exercise.

APPENDIX C

AIR FORCE SECURITY ASSISTANCE TEAMS

GENERAL

This appendix assists commanders in identifying and selecting appropriate options for foreign internal defense by providing a brief survey of teams who perform functions under security assistance. **One of the key operational-level objectives of Air Force advisory operations is to help integrate host-nation airpower into the multinational and joint arenas.** Commanders should refer to current directives and publications for guidelines and specific policy on assistance provided under the Air Force Security Assistance Program. It also discusses functions, goals, and special constraints associated with Air Force advisory support to host nations.

BASIS OF REQUIREMENT

Legislative guidance limits training and advising by permanently assigned SAO personnel. Also, SAOs are not, as a general rule, sufficiently sized or configured to advise and train or perform technical assistance duties that extend beyond primary (and essentially logistical) SAO functions. Outside assistance may be required in specific instances.

Types of Teams

Besides SAOs, several teams and organizations may perform limited security assistance functions for specified periods of time on a temporary duty (TDY) or permanent change of station (PCS) basis. These teams include technical assistance teams (TAT), technical assistance field teams (TAFT), mobile training teams (MTT), extended training service specialists (ETSS), quality assurance teams, language training detachments, site survey teams (SSTs), and defense requirement survey teams. Commanders for FID activities can employ these teams, and others assembled for specific purposes, such as health service support teams. In certain instances, temporarily deployed Air Force teams may be called on to advise foreign personnel on operational matters directly related to the use of host-nation resources in specific conflict situations.

Nontraining Support of Host-nation Forces

A variety of nontraining assistance functions can be accomplished under the security assistance program. The principal vehicles for nontraining support are TATs and TAFTs.

Technical Assistance Teams

In cases where the operational readiness of host aircraft and support equipment is seriously degraded because of battle damage, unexpected materiel failures, or long-term deficiencies in local maintenance and funding, a requirement for one-time repair and

refurbishment may exist. Introducing new equipment provided under security assistance may also require specialized Air Force assistance to place the systems in operation.

TATs and civilian engineering technical surveys can be deployed TDY to provide these services. In some cases, US or foreign civilian contract personnel may be used. Such nontraining support may be conducted in the host country or, when prohibited or deemed impractical because of inadequate local facilities, conducted out-of-country.

TATs should not be used to provide technical training or instruction except for incidental over-the-shoulder technical assistance in conjunction with their primary duties.

Technical Assistance Field Teams

Where ongoing aviation support requirements cannot be met through the combined efforts of the host air force, the SAO, and temporarily deployed Air Force teams, TAFTs can be assigned PCS to the host nation, normally for one year or longer, from DOD resources. TAFTs help install, operate, maintain, and support FMS, purchased weapons systems, and equipment. These functions can also be contractor-supported through FMS.

Specialized Nontraining Support

Besides TATs and TAFTs, other forms of nontraining support allow commanders to tailor team capabilities to meet specialized field requirements.

US Air Force logistics assistance teams (funded through security assistance) can use periodic visits to offset host nation materiel management deficiencies by performing inventories, refining procedures, clearing up back orders, and resolving accounting discrepancies.

The Air Force can provide other specialized forms of nontraining support. An example is theater technical training of US logisticians through the logistics team training (LTT) program. Small teams (10 to 15 individuals) train in such logistics skills as aircraft battle damage repair, corrosion control, materiel management, specialized maintenance, transportation operations, or other logistics support functions. Service O&M funds support the training of US personnel. Host nation security assistance funds pay for repair parts and other expendables used by an LTT during training activities.

- ★ The LTT concept is designed to ensure—and the Service must certify—that deployments offer opportunities for critical training that would not occur, or would occur at significantly higher costs or reduced efficiency, in another, similar geographic area. The concept is based on the precept that certain US forces training is so critical and reasonably unavailable that incidental, spin-off services provided to a foreign country in exchange for the training opportunities are insignificant in the balance of benefits, thereby making the training in the best interests of the US Government.
- ★ As with TATs, training or instruction of host personnel is limited to incidental, "over-the-shoulder" technical assistance.

Training Support to Host-nation Forces

In many cases, incidental "over-the-shoulder" instruction occurring as a by-product of certain nontraining functions may not be sufficient to produce significant improvements in long-term self-sufficiency. Training teams, funded under security assistance, should be used where more extensive, formally structured courses of instruction are required. The teams can be deployed either TDY or PCS to reinforce SAO capabilities.

Mobile Training Teams

US Air Force MTTs deployed to the recipient nation add to SAO capabilities by training host-nation personnel in the operation, maintenance, and employment of air and space weapon systems and support equipment. MTTs are authorized for specific in-country training requirements beyond the capability of SAOs, primarily to develop the recipient's self-training capabilities in particular skills. MTTs may be funded from either FMS or international military education and training programs.

MTTs are also authorized to provide training associated with equipment transfers or to conduct surveys and assessments of training requirements. MTTs may be requested to carry out specific training tasks for limited periods of time.

MTTs will not be used to assemble, maintain, operate, or renovate a system.

Extended Training

Sustained Air Force training capabilities are available through ETSS who are technically qualified to provide advice, instruction, and training in the engineering, installation, operation, and maintenance of weapons, equipment, and systems.

Advisory Support to Host-nation Forces

When specifically authorized and directed, deployed Air Force security assistance teams advise host military personnel on using air and space systems and related support capabilities. Advisory functions are subject to legislative restrictions and DOD directives on levels and types of assistance provided. Commanders and SAO personnel requesting this type of assistance must ensure that advisory activities fall within current policy guidelines and legal parameters.

Command Advisory Functions

US Air Force advisory assistance may be required to facilitate host air force support of IDAD objectives and to encourage a satisfactory correlation between US security assistance goals and the recipient's use of security assistance assets. Advisory assistance teams accomplish these tasks by advising central command elements of the host military on the capabilities, limitations, and correct use of airpower in a given conflict. Command advisory functions focus on operational-level planning that can bridge the gap between IDAD strategy and tactical employment.

Field Advisory Functions

US Air Force advisory assistance conducted at the field level (operational flying units, aviation support elements, and army maneuver units) focuses primarily on improving host military tactics, techniques, and procedures for air and space operations.

Air Force advisory functions include mission-related advice on intelligence collection and analysis, maintenance, logistics, communications, and administration as well as tactical operations. Field advisory support also has important applications in medical and military civic action programs, military construction, and psychological operations. Its principal objective is to provide guidance fostering self-sufficiency in the use of air and space resources for the conflict at hand, not to supplant host-nation capabilities.

Field advisory functions should be closely linked to operational-level objectives supporting overall US/host-nation strategic goals. This entails such field advisory functions as testing and verifying host-nation airpower employment and sustainment capabilities, focusing host-nation aviation resources on appropriate roles and missions, and facilitating the availability of safe, reliable, and interoperable aviation support as a force multiplier for the joint force commander.

Field advisory functions are not automatically linked to direct participation in host military operations. Advisory functions that expose US personnel to hostile fire represent a significant increase in US commitment with profound legal and political implications. Under current law, personnel performing defense services may not perform any duties of a combatant nature, including any duties related to training and advising, that may engage US personnel in combat activities outside the United States.

SUGGESTED READINGS

Air Force Publications

(Note: All Air Force doctrine documents are available on the Air Force Doctrine Center web page at <https://www.doctrine.af.mil>)

AFDD 2-3, *Military Operations Other Than War*

AFDD 2-4, *Combat Support*

AFDD 2-4.1, *Force Protection*

AFDD 2-4.2, *Health Services*

AFDD 2-5, *Information Operations*

AFDD 2-7, *Special Operations*

Joint Publications

JP 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*

JP 3-07, *Military Operations Other Than War*

JP 3-07.1, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense*

JP 3-07.6, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance*

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GLOSSARY

Abbreviations and Acronyms

AETF	air and space expeditionary task force
AF	Air Force
AFDC	Air Force Doctrine Center
AFDD	Air Force doctrine document
AFSOC	Air Force Special Operations Command
AFSOF	Air Force special operations forces
ANG	Air National Guard
AOR	area of responsibility
ARVN	Army of the Republic of Vietnam
C2	command and control
CA	civil affairs
CAA	combat aviation advisors
CAS	close air support
CETS	civilian engineering technical survey
CMO	civil-military operations
COG	Center of gravity
COMAFFOR	commander of Air Force forces
CS	coalition support
CSAR	combat search and rescue
DOD	Department of Defense
DOS	Department of State
DSCA	Defense Security Cooperation Agency
EI	essential elements of information
ETSS	extended training service specialists
FDS	foundational doctrine statements
FID	foreign internal defense
FMLN	Farabundo Martí Liberation Front
FMS	foreign military sales
GPS	Global positioning system
HA	humanitarian assistance
HCA	humanitarian and civil assistance
HN	host nation
HSS	Health services support
HUMINT	human resources intelligence
IDAD	internal defense and development

IMET	international military education and training
IMINT	imagery intelligence
IO	information operations
ISR	intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
KAF	Khmer Air Force
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JFSOCC	joint force special operations component commander
JP	joint publication
JSOTF	joint special operations task force
JTF	joint task force
JTTP	joint tactics, techniques, and procedures
LAUSTOL	helio stallion light armed utility take-off and land
LOC	line of communications
LTT	logistics team training
MAJCOM	major command
MCA	military civil action
MOOTW	military operations other than war
MTT	military training team
NVA	North Vietnamese Army
O&M	operations and maintenance
OAD	operational aviation detachment
OPCON	operational control
PCS	permanent change of station
PSYOP	psychological operation
REDHORSE	Rapid Engineers Deployable Heavy Operations Repair Squadron, Engineers
SA	security assistance
SAO	security assistance organization
SIGINT	signals intelligence
SOF	special operations forces
SOS	special operations squadron
SST	site survey team
TAFT	technical assessment field team
TAIP	tactical air force improvement plan
TALCE	tanker airlift operations

TAT	tactical assessment team
TDY	temporary duty
TTP	tactics, techniques, and procedures
UN	United Nations
UNAAF	Unified Action Armed Forces
US	United States
USAF	United States Air Force
UW	unconventional warfare
WWII	World War II

Definitions

advising foreign aviation forces. Providing advice on air and space power issues enabling foreign aviation forces to employ and sustain their own resources within the context of specific times, places, and operational situations. Includes operational-level mission planning; tactical employment; sustainment methods and basing concepts to effectively employ airpower. (AFDD 2-3.1)

air and space expeditionary task force. The organizational manifestation of Air Force forces afield. The AETF provides a joint force commander with a task-organized, integrated package with the appropriate balance of force, sustainment, control, and force protection. Also called **AETF**. (AFDD 1)

air and space power. The synergistic application of air, space, and information systems to project global strategic military power. (AFDD 1)

assessing foreign aviation forces. Determining, through various means, the capabilities, limitations, and intent of foreign aviation forces, primarily in support of theater combatant commanders, subordinate commands, and other key agencies and departments of the United States government. (AFDD 2-3.1)

assisting foreign aviation forces. Helping foreign aviation forces execute specific tasks, operations and missions, through both technical and operational means including training, advising, and logistics support, and through direct participation by United States forces in tactical operations and events. (AFDD 2-3.1)

campaign. A series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space. See also **campaign plan**. (JP 1-02)

campaign plan. A plan for a series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space. See also **campaign**. (JP 1-02)

centralized control. 1. In air defense, the control mode whereby a higher echelon makes direct target assignments to fire units. 2. In joint air operations, placing within one commander the responsibility and authority for planning, directing, and coordinating a military operation or group/category of operations. See also **decentralized control.** (JP 1-02)

civil affairs. Designated Active and Reserve component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs activities and to support civil-military operations. Also called **CA.** See also **civil affairs activities.** (JP 1-02)

civil-military operations. The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational US objectives. Civil-military operations may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil-military operations may be performed by designated civil affairs, by other military forces, or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces. Also called **CMO.** See also **civil affairs.** (JP 1-02)

command and control. The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission. Also called **C2.** (JP 0-2)

coordination. The necessary action to ensure adequate exchange of information to integrate, synchronize, and deconflict operations between separate organizations. Coordination is not necessarily a process of gaining approval but is most often used for mutual exchange of information. Normally used between functions of a supporting staff. Direct authority to liaison (DIRLAUTH) is used to coordinate with an organization outside of the immediate staff or organization. (AFDD 1)

counterinsurgency. Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency. Also called **COIN.** (JP 1-02)

decentralized execution. Delegation of execution authority to subordinate commanders. (JP 1-02) [Decentralized execution of air and space power is the delegation of execution authority to responsible and capable lower-level commanders to achieve effective span of control and to foster disciplined initiative, situational responsiveness, and tactical flexibility.] (AFDD 1) {Italicized words in brackets apply only to the Air Force and are offered for clarity.}

direction. Guidance to or management of support staff functions. Inherent within command but not a command authority in its own right. In some cases, can be considered an explicit instruction or order. Used by commanders and their designated subordinates to facilitate, channel, or motivate support staff to achieve appropriate action, tempo, or intensity. Used by directors of staff agencies on behalf of the commander to provide guidance to their staffs on how best to accomplish stated objectives IAW the commander's intent. (AFDD 1)

direct support. A mission requiring a force to support another specific force and authorizing it to answer directly to the supported force's request for assistance. Also called **DS**. (JP 1-02)

doctrine. Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application. (JP 1-02)

effects. A full range of outcomes, events, or consequences of a particular action or set of actions. The action can derive from any element of power—economic, political, military, diplomatic, or informational—and may occur at any point across the continuum from peace to global conflict. (AFDD 2-1.2)

essential elements of information. The critical items of information regarding the enemy and the environment needed by the commander by a particular time to relate with other available information and intelligence in order to assist in reaching a logical decision. Also called **EEI**. (AFDD 2-3.1)

force protection. Actions taken to prevent or mitigate hostile actions against Department of Defense personnel (to include family members), resources, facilities, and critical information. These actions conserve the force's fighting potential so it can be applied at the decisive time and place and incorporate the coordinated and synchronized offensive and defensive measures to enable the effective employment of the joint force while degrading opportunities for the enemy. Force protection does not include actions to defeat the enemy or protect against accidents, weather, or disease. Also called **FP**. (JP 1-02 [An integrated application of offensive and defensive actions that deter, detect, preempt, mitigate, or negate threats against Air Force air and space operations and assets, based on an acceptable level of risk.] {Italicized words in brackets apply only to the Air Force and are offered for clarity.})

foreign internal defense. Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. Also called **FID**. (JP 1-02)

foreign military sales. That portion of United States security assistance authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of

1976, as amended. This assistance differs from the Military Assistance Program and the International Military Education and Training Program in that the recipient provides reimbursement for defense articles and services transferred. Also called **FMS**. (JP 1-02)

guerrilla warfare. Military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces. Also called **GW**. See also **unconventional warfare**. (JP 1-02)

host nation. A nation that receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations, coalition partners, and/or NATO organizations to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory. Also called **HN**. (JP 1-02)

humanitarian and civic assistance. Assistance to the local populace provided by predominantly US forces in conjunction with military operations and exercises. This is specifically authorized by Title 10, United States Code, section 401, and funded under separate authorities. Assistance provided under these provisions is limited to (1) medical, dental, and veterinary care provided in rural areas of a country; (2) construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems; (3) well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities; and (4) rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities. Assistance must fulfill unit training requirements that incidentally create humanitarian benefit to the local populace. Also called **HCA**. (JP 1-02)

indirect support. Security assistance and other efforts to develop and sustain host nation capabilities. [This definition establishes a distinction between security assistance and forms of support involving direct operational employment of US forces which supports the guidance in the *National Security Strategy of the United States*.] (AFDD 2-3.1)

insurgency. An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict. (JP 1-02)

integrating foreign aviation forces. The process of bringing all key tasks (assessing, training, advising, and assisting) together in a coordinated effort to draw foreign aviation forces into multinational and joint operations supporting theater campaigns and contingencies. (AFDD 2-3.1)

internal defense and development. The full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. It focuses on building viable institutions (political, economic, social, and military) that respond to the needs of society. Also called **IDAD**. See also **foreign internal defense**. (JP 1-02)

joint. Connotes activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which elements of two or more Military Departments participate. (JP 0-2)

joint force. A general term applied to a force composed of significant elements, assigned or attached, of two or more Military Departments operating under a single joint

force commander. (JP 1-02)

joint force commander. A general term applied to a combatant commander, subunified commander, or joint task force commander authorized to exercise combatant command (command authority) or operational control over a joint force. Also called **JFC**. (JP 1-02)

joint task force. A joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a subunified commander, or an existing joint force commander. Also called **JTF**. (JP 1-02)

military civic action. The use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the local population at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and others contributing to economic and social development, which would also serve to improve the standing of the military forces with the population. (US forces may at times advise or engage in military civic actions in overseas areas.) Also called **MCA**. (JP 1-02)

military operations other than war. Operations that encompass the use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war. These military actions can be applied to complement any combination of the other instruments of national power and occur before, during, and after war. Also called **MOOTW**. (JP 1-02) [*An umbrella term encompassing a variety of military operations conducted by the Department of Defense that normally complement the other instruments of national power. These military operations are as diverse as providing support and assistance (when consistent with US law) in a nonthreatening environment, and conducting combat not associated with war.* {Italicized words in brackets applies only to the Air Force and is offered for clarity.}]

mission. 1. The task, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason therefore. 2. In common usage, especially when applied to lower military units, a duty assigned to an individual or unit; a task. 3. The dispatching of one or more aircraft to accomplish one particular task. (JP 1-02)

narcoterrorism. Terrorism conducted to further the aims of drug traffickers. It may include assassinations, extortion, hijackings, bombings and kidnappings directed against judges, prosecutors, elected officials, or law enforcement agents, and general disruption of a legitimate government to divert attention from drug operations. (JP 1-02)

nation assistance. Civic and/or military assistance rendered to a nation by foreign forces within that nation's territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. Nation assistance programs include, but are not limited to, security assistance, foreign internal defense, other Title 10 U.S.C. (DOD) programs, and activities performed on a reimbursable basis by Federal agencies or international organizations. (JP 1-02)

psychological operations. Planned operations to convey selected information and

indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives. Also called **PSYOP**. (JP 1-02)

operational control. Command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority) and may be delegated within the command. When forces are transferred between combatant commands, the command relationship the gaining commander will exercise (and the losing commander will relinquish) over these forces must be specified by the Secretary of Defense. Operational control is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions; it does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. Also called **OPCON**. (JP 1-02)

policy. Guidance that is directive or instructive, stating what is to be accomplished. It reflects a conscious choice to pursue certain avenues, and not others. Policies may change due to changes in national leadership, political considerations, or for fiscal reasons. At the national level, policy may be expressed in such broad vehicles such as the National Security Strategy. Within military operations, policy may be expressed not only in terms of objectives, but also in rules of engagement (ROE) – what we may or may not strike, or under what circumstances we may strike particular targets. (AFDD 1)

psychological operations. Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives. Also called **PSYOP**. (JP 1-02)

public affairs. Those public information, command information, and community relations activities directed toward both the external and internal publics with interest in the Department of Defense. Also called **PA**. (JP 1-02)

roles Broad and enduring purposes for which Services were established by law. The role of the Air Force is to organize, train, and equip “primarily for prompt and sustained

offensive and defensive air operations” (National Security Act, 1947).

security assistance. Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services, by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. Also called **SA**. (JP 1-02)

security assistance organization. All Department of Defense elements located in a foreign country with assigned responsibilities for carrying out security assistance management functions. It includes military assistance advisory groups, military missions and groups, offices of defense and military cooperation, liaison groups, and defense attaché personnel designated to perform security assistance functions. (JP 1-02)

services. As related to security assistance, includes any service, test, inspection, repair, training, publication, technical or other assistance, or defense information used for the purpose of furnishing nonmilitary assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961, as amended, or for making military sales under the US Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended. (AFDD 2-3.1)

special operations. Operations conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to achieve military, diplomatic, informational, and/or economic objectives employing military capabilities for which there is no broad conventional force requirement. These operations often require covert, clandestine, or low visibility capabilities. Special operations are applicable across the range of military operations. They can be conducted independently or in conjunction with operations of conventional forces or other government agencies and may include operations through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces. Special operations differ from conventional operations in degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets. Also called **SO**. (JP 1-02)

strategic intelligence. Intelligence that is required for the formation of strategy, policy, and military plans and operations at national and theater levels. (JP 1-02)

strategy. The art and science of developing and employing instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives. (JP 1-02)

subversion. Action designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, or political strength or morale of a regime. (JP 1-02)

support. 1. The action of a force that aids, protects, complements, or sustains another force in accordance with a directive requiring such action. 2. A unit that helps another unit in battle. 3. An element of a command that assists, protects, or supplies other forces in combat. (JP 1-02)

tactical control. Command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. Tactical control is inherent in operational control. Tactical control may be delegated to, and exercised at any level at or below the level of combatant command. When forces are transferred between combatant commands, the command relationship the gaining commander will exercise (and the losing commander will relinquish) over these forces must be specified by the Secretary of Defense. Tactical control provides sufficient authority for controlling and directing the application of force or tactical use of combat support assets within the assigned mission or task. Also called **TACON**. (JP 1-02)

tactical intelligence. Intelligence that is required for planning and conducting tactical operations. (JP 1-02)

tactical level of war. The level of war at which battles and engagements are planned and executed to accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces. Activities at this level focus on the ordered arrangement and maneuver of combat elements in relation to each other and to the enemy to achieve combat objectives. (JP 1-02)

terrorism. The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological. See also **force protection**. (JP 1-02)

training foreign aviation forces. Instructional programs and activities enabling foreign aviation forces to accomplish a variety of functional tasks, roles, and missions. Imparts employable capabilities ranging from technical skills, sustainment functions, and tactical flying skills to knowledge of airpower doctrine. Includes operational planning and employment; combat tactics, techniques, and procedures; sustainment methods; and operational support activities to include design and employment of communication structures. (AFDD 2-3.1)

unconventional warfare. A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes, but is not limited to, guerrilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and unconventional assisted recovery. Also called **UW**. (JP 1-02)

war. Open and often prolonged conflict between nations (or organized groups within nations) to achieve national objectives. (AFDD 1)